A Comparison of the Foreign Policies of the United States and Canada by Braid, Robert Bruce
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Masters Theses Graduate School
6-1967
A Comparison of the Foreign Policies of the United
States and Canada
Robert Bruce Braid
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information,
please contact trace@utk.edu.
Recommended Citation
Braid, Robert Bruce, "A Comparison of the Foreign Policies of the United States and Canada. " Master's Thesis, University of
Tennessee, 1967.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/4356
To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Robert Bruce Braid entitled "A Comparison of the Foreign
Policies of the United States and Canada." I have examined the final electronic copy of this thesis for form
and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
of Master of Arts, with a major in Political Science.
Vernon Iredell, Major Professor
We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance:
Anita Elliot
Accepted for the Council:
Dixie L. Thompson
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)
Mq 2, 1967 
To the Graduate Collllcil: 
I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Robert Bruce Braid, 
Jr., entitled "A Comparison or the Foreign Policies or the United States 
and Canada." I recommend that it be accepted for nine quarter hours of 
credit in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts, with a major in Political Science. 
We have read this thesis and 
recommend its acceptance: 
A,w.g;J.<[� 
s/49:h!.'flAi(.,.� // 
�1�2�/J/ 
Major Professor ' 
Accepted for the Council: 
ce Prea t or 
Graduate Studies and Research 
A COMPARISON OF THE FOREIGN POLICIES 
OF '1'HE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 
A Thesis 
Presented to 
the Graduate Council of 
The University of Tennessee 
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Master of Arts 
by 
Robert Bruce Braid, Jr. 
June 1967 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER PAGE 
I • INTRODUCTION • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • l 
II. THE 0� FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATF.3 AND CANADA 3 
III. THE NORTH AMERICAN AlR DEFENSE COMMAND • 
IV. C'UBA.. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
. . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
V. THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION • • • • • • • . . . . 
VI. THE QUESTION OF CHINA 
VII. CONCLUSION • • •  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
BIBLIOGRAPHY • • • • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • • • • • • • 
ii 
730316 
16 
31 
47 
66 
86 
89 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
During the pressing course of intemational events in the nuclear 
age, most Americans are inclined to regard the great bulk of the North 
American continent north of the Rio Grande as a tranquil bastion of 
unanimity in a sea ·or diverse, quarreling states and groups of states 
continually vying for pover in the world arena. Such an outlook, however, 
is decidedly incorrect for it is based either upon the false a&SUllption 
that the foreign polic7 o_f our Canadian neighbors is synonymous with that 
ot the United States or, worse, that Canada is for all intents and pur­
poses unimportant or virtually non-existent and, hence, without a 
meaningful foreign policy. This ignorance of Canada not only manifests 
itself in regard to questions of foreign polic7 but in addition holds 
true for all things Canadian. A:mericans in general sillply take Canada 
for granted or forget it exists altogether. This attitude toward one's 
neighbor, all1', and best custom.er is qtlite inappropriate and, in fact, 
dangerous when extended to the field of foreign affairs. 
This writer certainly has no illusions as to the possibility of 
correcting this attitude by means of this thesis. It is felt, nonetheless, 
that a discussion of the similarities and dissimilarities in Canadian and 
United States policies on major Cold War issues serves a useful purpose in 
helping to clarify the fact that while both countries have an interest in 
protecting themselves against aggression and in promoting Western liberal 
1 
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traditions, the policies of both nations are not always similar. 
This study will also bring out the important r act that neither 
the United States nor Canada formulates its .foreign policies alone. The 
two nations are so closel,1' associated that neither could act alone in the 
:international arena without taking cognisance of the attitudes or the 
other. Essentially, the situation which exists is that of a large and a 
small country sharing the same continent with the smaller nation striving 
on the one hand to maintain its independence from its larger partner and 
on the other seeking to achieve the same international goals of the latter 
under its leadership. As the big neighbor with many other considerations, 
the United States has not always given due consideration to its smaller 
partner. For Canada the ,mequal relationship has been of vast importance, 
while for the United States it has been of rather minimal significance. 
Rather than attempt to anaqze the entire scope of the foreign re­
lations of both countries, this thesis will concern itself with studies 
of four important foreign policy issues of the Cold War as well as an 
initial chapter examining the major goals and precepts of American and 
Canadian foreign policy. Chapters have been included on Cuba, the North 
American Air Defense Command, the Horth Atlantic Treaty Organization, and 
China in order to provide a good selection o.r important and representative 
issues upon which worthwhile conclusions can be made. 
CHAPTER Il 
THE GENERAL FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA · 
The appropriate place to begin a study of the similarities and 
dissimilarities of United States and Canadian foreign policies on major 
Cold War issues and the influence of each country- upon the foreign 
policies of the other is with an examination of the general purposes of 
those foreign policies. It is only after determining the general policies 
of the two nations that the individual issues can be correct� an&qzed 
and understood. 
Since the close of' the Second World War, the United States has been 
the recognized leader of' those nations of the globe which have grouped 
themselves into what is normal� referred to as the Free World. In 
opposition to this grouping is the block of communist states led primarily 
by the Soviet Union but rivaled in recent years by an emerging Communist 
China. The United States assumed the leadership role of the Free World 
somewhat paintully during the Truman administration after it became 
evident in the immediate post-World War II period that the Big Five 
alliance of' the United States, France, Great Britain, China, and the 
Soviet Union which had united to defeat the Axis powers would not survive 
to become the nucleus of' a new world order which would eliminate any 
future possibilities of world conflict. It was through such events as 
the loss of Eastern Europe to Soviet imperialism, the Berlin Airlift, 
the end of the United States nuclear monopoly, and the Korean conflict 
3 
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that the United States acquired the psychological conditioning and ex-
perience necessary for Free World leadership in what has come to be known 
as the Cold War� 
During this time of "baptisa bu fire" for the United States, Canada 
too was faced with momentous decisions regarding its own course of action 
in world affairs. Farsighted Canadians could see that the historical 
triangular.relationship between Canada, Great Britain, and the United 
States which had served their country so well by balancing off the some­
what more import.ant and traditional English transatlantic influence with 
the American southerly influence and thereby preserving an independent 
Canada would become more and more a north-south relationship as American 
power and influence eclipsed that of Great Britain. The Canadian fear 
of absorption by the United States consequently grew as the American 
magnet increased in strength. Thus, while Canada, like the United 
States, cast her lot with the Free World in opposing international 
communism, she nonetheless had to remain ever mindful of protecting her 
own independence .from, coincidentally enough., the very country which was 
her chief benefactor and accepted leader, the United States. 
To Americans this fear of absorption on the part of Canada might 
at first seem rather groundless, but the facts tend to support Canada's 
fears. United States :influence over a large segment of the Canadian 
economy is only slight� less than overwhelming. Figures from the year 
1965 indicate that American interests control 52 per cent of the mining 
and smelting industry; 95 per cent of the automotive industry; 90 per 
cent of the rubber products industry"; 75 per cent of the petroleum 
industry; and 65 per cent of the electrical appliances industry in 
Canada. At the present rate of American investment, it is estimated 
that 80 per· cent of Canada I a manufacturing industry will be under · 
5 
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1 American control in twenty years. Indeed, no nation can afford to have 
such a large percentage of its own industry controlled by' another country 
and still hope to exercise any degree of independence in foreign or even 
domestic affairs. 
The entire problem facing Canada in regard to the United States 
was stated quite. accurately by Mason Wade in the book The United States 
and Canada: 
Canada has alvays been a willed nation, existing despite the 
conscious and unconscious foTces which have sought to absorb it 
into its much more populous and powerful neighbor. As the post­
war period opened, the will to maintain the Canadian nation which 
had achieved new world status as a result of its remarkable war­
ti.llle efforts was probably stronger than ever before, and continu­
ing boom instead of anticipating depression revived the hope of 
the twentieth being Canada I s century. A Canadian nationalism 
which had long reacted against British dominance was now to react 
chief4" against the United States, as Washington replaced London 
as the chief center of influence upon Canada, and as American 
pressures on Canada increased in countless ways. But coupled 
with the instinctive traditional tendency to resist 
Americanization was the reluctant realization that, whether 
Canadians liked it or not, Canada's dest� was now bound up 
with that of the United States, that the north-south continental 
relationship had become imnaenser more significant than the 
traditional transatlantic ones. 
1aerald Clark ., Canada: The Uneasy Neighbor (New York: David 
Mciq Comp8Jl1', 1965), P• 90. 
2Mason Wade, "The Roots of the Relationship., " The United States 
� Canadat ed. John S. Dickey (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. i Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., 1964J, pp • .$3-54. 
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During the early postwar period, both the United States and 
Canada thus were forced to adapt to entirely new roles in the field of 
foreign affairs. The United States had to alter its outlook on world 
affairs from an isolationist position to an involved, internationalist 
position, whereas Canada had to sever the last vestiges of' its •colonial" 
ties with Great Britain, establish itself in the world as a "middle 
power,• and at the same time preserve itself intact from incorporation 
into the United States. Neither course proved eas;r for the two countries, 
and the difficulties surrounding their roles manifest themselves on marJ1' 
occasions even today. 
As the lead.er or the Free World, America has forged a foreign 
policy which in its essential characteristics has been dominated by the 
goal of ha1 ting the spread of international communism. The pri.mary' 
method-at least in Europe--or achieving this goal has been through the 
use or the containment policy first enunciated in 1947 by George F. 
Kennan in an anonymous article in Foreign Affairs magazine.3 Alliances 
were created in the earlier period of the Cold War for the purposes of 
protecting United States,interests and preventing further comnnmist 
encroachments on non-communist areas of the world. The various proble:ms 
which have arisen around the world have been judged according to the 
potential communist threat inherent within them and dealt with 
accordingly. Canadians, on the other hand, have taken a somewhat less 
3willia P. Gerberding, United States Foreign Policy: 
Perspectives � Analysis (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Comp8JJ1', 1966), 
P• 17. 
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rigid approach toward the communist threat which has been, in fact, more 
coincident with their position in the world as a middle power. This 
approach has persisted throughout the Cold War period, and it is this 
somewhat more flexible Canadian approach to East-West tensions which 
has led to occasional problems between the two countries. 
Part of the background of the Canadian uneasiness ••• is 
the tact that Canadians, while certainly gener� sympathetic 
to the United States in the present world crisis, do not all 
have unllmi ted confidence in American policy. They are in fact 
rather less inclined to run a high tenperature over the Russian 
menace than Americans are. Canada's idea of a world policy was 
thus defined by" a member of the Government in 1960: "an un­
remitting search for the lessening of international tensigns 
and ••• means of bringing about permanent disarmament. " 
During the Cold War period, the Canadians have developed a certain 
capacity for mediating disputes and taking part in peace-keeping missions 
of various types. Canada has been in the forefront a disproportionatell' 
large number of tim�s in seeking a peaceful solution to issues which have 
divided the Eastern and Western blocs of nations even though her ultimate 
allegiance has always been vi.th the West. Canadian participation in the 
Cyprus dispute, the Suez crisis, and the International Control Commission 
in Vietnam are examples of that nation's role as a mediator in world 
affairs. 
In regard to the United Nations, Canadian policy has been one of 
placing a considerable amount of faith in that organization in the search 
for some form of world order. "Canadians seem at times more inclined 
4c. P. Stacey, "Twenty-one Years of Military Co-operation," 
Canada-United States Treaty Relations, ed. David R. Deener (Durham, North 
Carolina: �e University Press, 1963), p. 120. 
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than Americans to look to the United Nations, with hope if' not with con­
fidence., as the ultimate rock upon which international peace might be 
built; and there is less cynicism about its evident weaknesses.•$ The 
primar;r reason tor this faith in the United Nations lies once again in 
Canada's characteristic approach to world affairs as a mediator and 
middle power. The United Nations serves as an indispensable organ tor 
Canada's mediation and conciliation work. 
While the United States has undertaken to organize and lead several 
alliances, Canada has sought to remain somewhat less involved in this 
respect by restricting herself to membership :fn the North American Air 
Defense Command, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization., and the Common­
wealth of lfations. While this membership list might at first appear 
rather consequential, it should be remembered that NORAD is essential.ly" a 
bilateral, continental defense agreement, and membership in the loosely­
lmit Commonwealth is simply- a manifestation of' Canada's traditional 
attachment to Great Britain. Thus, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
represents the o� major commitment on the part of' Canada in Cold War 
organizations far-removed from Canadian territory. Signif'icantq, Canada 
has sought to remain somewhat aloof from Western Hemisphere affairs by 
remajning outside the Organization of American States. "Canadian in­
difference., small commercial interest, and tear of becoming involved in 
disputes between the United States and other membere of the OAS replaced 
$Richard A. Preston., Canada in World Affairs: 1959-1961 
(Toronto: Oxford University Press,1965), p. 3. 
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the earlier chief impediment..-lack of American enthusiasm for Canadian 
me�bership.•6 Likewise, Canada sought no participation in the Southeast 
Asia Treat7 Organization or the Central Treat7 Organization when these 
organizations were formed. Lack of involvement in these alliances has 
enabled Canada to maintain a more independent stance in affairs affect­
ing these areas and has increased her capacity for the role of mediator. 
The United States, as either the leading member in such alliances or as a 
staunch supporter in the case of CENTO, has al'W&.y'S become immediate� and 
deeply involved as a participant in a.n:r dispute or crisis which has arisen 
in these areas. 
This difference in the respective roles plqed by Canada and the 
United States in international affairs has been at the root of lDBJ1Y of 
the differences in foreign policies which have arisen over the past 
twenty years. A particular policy utilized by the United States as an 
involved and committed leader has not a1W'81'8 coincided with the par­
ticular policy followed by Canada as a middle power quite often unmvolved 
in the issue at hand. 
In a 1965 speech, Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson made 
the following statement on the conduct of his country's foreign affairs 
vis-a-vis those of the United States: 
Canadian views on specific issues are not alwqs the same as 
those of the United States. There is not always a complete 
identity of interests between them, nor will there be in the 
future. This is because, over the years, we have been developing 
6 
Ibid., P• 176. 
our own character in Canada, our own external interests and our 
own judgments, just as the United States has developed its. 
While we mu.st never ignore the heavy world responsibilities of 
the United States, we feel bound to speak with our own voice on 
any problem., which are of concern to us. We like to know what 
our big partners are doing, especially' our neighbor. This, how­
ever, should not be cause for diequiet. Canadian interests in 
fact run parallel to those of the United States over a very wide 
range of problems, and our two cTtries have a fundamentally' 
similar outlook on world affairs. 
10 
This passage indicates the note of independence which Canadians feel they 
mu.st inject into their foreign policy on various occasions. Yet it also 
illustrates Canadian recognition of the United States' position as leader 
of the Free World. Prime Minister Pearson points out that the fundamental 
interests of the United States and Canada are the same but that this fact 
alone does not rule out differences of opinion regarding particular inter­
national issues which may concern the two nations. 
Most of the countries of the world probab:cy- have not felt the need 
to •prove" their independence of thought and action in foreign affairs as 
has Canada. Once again the Canadian fear of being ignored or taken for 
granted b,- the United States is manifested in Mr. Pearson's statement. 
This strong desire to exert Canadian independence in foreign af'!airs has 
been demonstrated on more than one occasion during the Cold War and 
should not be overlooked in examining the foreign policies of Canada in 
relation to those of the United States. In general the United States has 
respected what at times appears to be an exaggerated preoccupation with 
an independent foreign policy on the part of Canada, although on occasions 
7Lester B. Pearson, "Good Neighborhood, tt Foreign Affairs, XLIII 
(January, 1965), 260-261. 
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such as the Cuban missile crisis, this American patience has shown signs 
of disappearing. Canadian leaders have indicated that they realize that 
dif'ference for the mere sake of difference in the conduct of their 
country's foreign policy is unwise. In a speech before the Canada Club 
of Ottawa in February, 1965, Prime Minister Pearson stated: 
· The satisfaction we get from national identity and independence 
must be related to the requirements of interdependence and the 
recognition of the global responsibilities or the United States 
in the pursuit of objectives and values that we share • • • • 
We must never disagree with the United States •ae'.q for the 
purpose of rousing a chauvinistic cheer at home. 
The United States has never publicq indicated its assessment of 
Canada's attempt at keeping its foreign policy disagreements with the 
United States above the nchauvinistic cheers," but Secretary of State 
Dulles and later President Kennedy gave indications that they were some­
what perturbed at Canada over particular instances or disagreement. It 
appears, nonetheless, that Canada and the United States have general:cy, 
managed to keep their disagreements behind closed doors in an effort to 
compromise and to keep them from becoming too intense and salt-centered. 
Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin, indicated 
the five basic requirements necessary for an independent Canadian foreign 
policy, none of which should create undue anxiety in the United States 
over possible Canadian chauvinism. The five requirements were: 
(1) We must have military security; 
(2) We must have expanding economic strength; 
(3) We mu.st be able to exert influence on others; 
8Leater B. Pearson, "The Face of the World in 1965," External 
Affairs, XVII (March, 1965), 85. 
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(4) We must be able and willing to play a creative role in many 
areas of international affairs; and 
(5) We must maintain a basic unity at ho• in Canada concerning our 
national interest in world af'fairs. 9 
A.ctual:q, none of these five points is very extraordinary, and most 
nations undoubte� conduct their foreign relations along similar broad 
outlines as these. Proximity to the United States, however, places 
Canada in a particularly vulnerable position in regard to the first 
three requirements. American influence and power cannot be ignored by 
Canada even if that country so desired. The fifth point, while holding 
true for all nations, is obvious:q, in reference to the recurrent diffi­
culties which the Canadians are experiencing between the English-speaking 
majority and the increasing:q, separatist-minded French-speaking minority. 
Dissension in the put .four to five years has come increasingly into the 
open with the very- future of Canadian nationhood sometimes appearing to 
be in some doubt. 
In examining the foreign policies of the United States and Canada, 
it is essential to have some knowledge of the various forces in each 
country which pl&y' a part in the creation of its foreign poliey. Both 
nations have a representative form of government with Canada utilizing 
a Parliamentary system and the United States a Presidential system. 
Because both countries have a representative system, individual 
legislators are subject in quite similar ways to various pressure groups 
and other outside influences which seek to determine various courses in 
9Paul Martin, "An Independent Foreign Policy," External Affairs 
XVIll (March, 1966), 12$. 
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foreign affairs just as in aey other :field. Immigrant groups, labor 
unions, farm organizations., industry, the military., and the news media 
have all pl.&1'ed a part in the formulation of Canadian foreign policy just 
as their counterparts have in the United States. Indeed., many Canadian 
labor unions and businesses are controlled by their counterparts in the 
10 
United States. Farm groups from the Canadian prairies have been active 
1n pressing the Canadian government to sell increasingq more wheat to 
Communist China. A. V. Roe Canada, Ltd., manufacturer of the ill-
starred Arrow interceptor., attempted to determine Canadian foreign policy 
in regard to the North American Air Defense Command by lobbying for a 
production decision for its aircraf't--an attempt which proved unsuccess­
tui.12 Such attempts to influence foreign policy are numerous in Canada 
just as they are in the United States. In this country- attempts to in­
fluence :foreign policy abound with the National Council o:r Churches' 
pressure for recognition of Communist China and the refusal o:r the 
National Maritime Union to load British ships trading with North 
Vietnam serving as recent examples. 
The conduct of Canadian foreign relations is in the hands of the 
Department of External Affairs headed by the Secretary of State for 
lOClark, .2!?• £ll•, P• 217. 
12Peter c. Newman., Renegade _!!! Power: The Diefenbaker Years 
(New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1963), p. 3L.S. 
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External Affairs which is the counterpart to the United States Department 
of State headed by the Secretary of State. Both Secretaries are cabinet 
level officials responsible in Canada to the Prime Minister and in the 
United States to the President. In Canada, however, the Secretary of 
State for External Affairs must first be a member of the House of 
Commons before he can be appointed to the cabinet post by the Prime 
Minister. The American Secretary of State, of course, is not a member 
of either house of Congress. Committees concerned with the conduct of 
foreign affairs exist in both the Canadian House of Commns and Senate 
just as in the United States House of Representatives and Senate, but 
the influence and prestige of the Canadian committees do not measure up 
to those of' their American counterparts. This characteristic, however, 
by no means indicates that the Canadian legislature, which is for all 
practical purposes the House of Commons, has less control over foreign 
policy than the United States Congress. Actually, Canadian govemments 
can fall as a result of poor foreign policy decisions which is not true 
in the case of the United States government. A recent example is that 
of the Conservative government of John Diefenbaker which fell in 1963 
partially as a result of foreign policy difficulties with the United 
13 
States and the world in general. 
Little more needs to be said concerning the general outlines of 
Canadian and United States foreign policies or the instruments by which 
they carry out their respective policies. In the an�sis of the several 
13 
�., P• 400. 
major Cold War issues which follows, it is essential to rem.ember the 
differences in power, thinking, objectives, and organization which 
exist between the two countries. 
15 
CHA.PrER III 
THE NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE COMMAND 
The first aajor Cold War issue to be dealt with in this study con­
cerns the establishment and operation of the North American Air Defense 
Command normally referred to as NORAD. Probably no other issue has 
pointed up the major difficulties facing Canada and the United States in 
reconciling their differences on the proper conduct ot the Cold War as 
has NORAD. Canadian soYereignty; the su.prenaacy of American influence 
over the traditional British influence; the method of approach to the 
communist threat; and the nu.clear weapons issue all have plqed and, in 
tact, continue to play a part in the debate over Canadian membership in 
the bilateral NORAD pact. For the United States, on the other hand, 
NORAD has been simply an instrument for protecting North America from 
Soviet nuclear attack through the combined air defense forces of both the 
United States and Canada.1 The establishment of NORAD did not present 
the United States with the soul-searching questions in regard to its own 
role in the Cold War as it did in the case of Canada. 
In actuality the establishment of the North American Air Defense 
Command in 1957 did not mark the first time that Canada and the United 
States had ceoperated in the field of defense. "Canadian-.lmerican joint 
defense planning began with the establishment o:f' a Permanent Joint Board 
¾li.chael Barkway, "Canada Rediscovers Its History," Foreign 
Affairs, XXXVI (.April, 19$8), 410. 
16 
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of Defence •to consider in the broad sense the defence of the north half 
of the Western Hemisphere, ' by the Ogdensburg Declaration of August 17-
18, 1940.•2 The Ogdensburg agreement was soon supplemented on April 20, 
1941 by the Hyde Park Declaration in which both nations agreed to the 
"general principle that in mobilizing the resources of this continent 
each country should pro'Yi.de the other with the defense articles which 
it is best able to produce • •• and the production program should be 
coordinated to this end."3 These two declarations prond sufficient to 
get the two countries throngh the Second World War without undue diffi­
culties. On February 12, 1947 the Joint Statement for Defense Collabora­
tion was signed which provided for lillited collaboration for peacetime 
joint security and represented the first non-wartime defense arrangement 
between the two nations.4 
It was not until the next decade, however, that joint defense co­
operation took the form of impressive strategic defense installations 
designed specifical.17 for the nt1clear age. In 19.54, the Pinetree Line, 
a joint radar-equipped detection system in Canada, was completed, with 
both nations contributing to the effort. In the same year the Canadian­
onl.y- Mid-Canada Line, likewise a radar detection system, was completed. 
2-rheodore Ropp, "Politics, Strategy, and the Commitments of a 
Middle Power," Canada .. Uni ted States Treaty Relations, ed., DaTid R. 
Deener (Durhaa, N. c.: Duke UniTersity Press, 1963), p. 81. 
)Ibid., PP• 81-82. 
�bid., P• 82. 
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In 1957 the third and last detection system, the Distant Early Warning 
(DEW) Line, a joint Canadian-American project, was finished. S These 
earl)" warning systems designed to alert both countries to the approach 
of SoTiet nuclear bombers were incorporated into the NORAD system when 
that command became operational. The participation of the United States 
in the DEW Line project, however, proTOked some criticism in Canada over 
the possible loss of Canadian sovereignty in the northern part of that 
country. This criticism arose over the fear that American command of 
isolated sites in Canada might gradually extend itself over the un­
deTeloped northern wilds of the nation and in so doing displace Canadian 
6 
authority at least temporarily and possibly even permanently. 
With the formation of the North American Air Defense Command 
seTeral controTersial issues came decidedly into view as tar as Canadians 
were concerned. It was one thing to have radar warning systems strung 
out on Canadian soil whose purpose could be regarded as entirely defensive 
and non-com.batiTe, but it was entirely another matter to join into a pact 
with a vastly more powerful United States in which advanced weapons sys­
tems with nuclear capabilities would play a Tital role. In any all-out 
nuclear war involving the United States, Canada, by virtue of its member­
ship in NORAD, would automatically' become a participant, willingly' or 
otherwise. Because its geographic location placed it in the middJ.e of 
Sc. P. Stacey, "hent7-one Years of Military" Co-operation," 
Canada-United States Tre;gr Relations, ed. David R. Deener (Durham, N. C
.: 
Duke University Press ., l 3), pp. il.4-115. 
6 Ibid., P• 115. 
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the attack route for Soviet bombers approaching the United States, 
Canada would unavoidably become a major combat zone. These facts tended 
to heighten the controversy surrounding the NORAD issue in the minds of 
many Canadians as might be expected. 
One of the difficulties lying at the bottom or the NORAD 
controversy resulted from the differences in opinion regarding the threat 
of Soviet nuclear attack. In accord with its foreign policy in general, 
the United States took the threat of surprise nuclear attack from the 
communist world seriously-, and the NORAD defense agreement was a logical 
step in meeting this threat.
7 
Canadians, however, had always taken a 
more skeptical attitude than .Americans toward the possibilities of a 
nuclear attack from the Soviet Union. Defense authorities in Canada, 
cirllian and military alike, were less inclined to alarmist fears when 
eTaluating various intelligence reports on communist military capabili-
ties and motives. Canada's feelings regarding the necessity of the 
NORAD pact, therefore, differed from those or the United States. Canada 
did not wish to become over-involved emotionally in a defense agreement 
upon which she did not place as overriding importance as did her neighbor 
to the south. This skepticism regarding the threat which NORAD was de­
signed to counter did not dissolve after the establishment of the command 
and, indeed, in 1962 severely" hindered the operations of NORAD when the 
7Robert s. Horowitz, � Ramparts !!! Watch (Derby', Conn.: Monarch 
Books, Inc., 1964), P• 66. 
8James Bay.rs, "Sharing a Continent: The Hard Issues," .'!:h! United 
States and Canada, ed. John S. Dickey (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.i Prentice­
Hall, Iiic:, 1964), P• 63. 
20 
United States undertook certain precautionary moves in order to protect 
the North American continent from possible Soviet nuclear attack. 
This difference in the interpretation of Soviet motives and 
capabilities, however, did not obscure another fear Canadians had of 
involvement in an integrated defense system for the North American 
continent. Canadians feared that regardless of the chances or nuclear 
war between the United States and the Soviet Union, they did not want 
their nation to become automatically involved as a belligerant in the 
conflict merely because of its participation in NORAD.9 They reasoned 
that Canada, as a decidedly junior partner in the agreement, would have 
very little influence over American policy if and when that policy came 
into direct conflict with that of the Soviet Union. Should such an 
event occur, American officials would be forced, in all likelihood, to 
make crisis-ridden decisions with their Canadian allies being consulted 
only to a very limited degree or not at all. The probable result ot 
such rapidly transpiring events would be that Canada, with :military 
bases on its soil partially intended for defense of the United States, 
would find herself a target of Soviet bombers automatically without 
having the slightest say in any decisions leading to such a terrible 
chain of events. 
Differing from their Canadian allies, Americans considered the 
NORAD pact as merely a defense arrangement which carried with it no 
9aichard A. Preston, Canada in World Affairs: 1959-1961 
(Toronto: Oxford University Press,1965}, p. 146. 
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inherent dangers or involTing Canada unwillin� in a war because or 
unilateral actions on the part or the United States. _They stressed that 
the NORAD agreement required consultation between both countries and 
that neither nation had authority to initiate o!tensive nuclear or non­
nuclear action.10 The Strategic Air Command {SAC) represented the 
United States nuclear retaliatory- forces, and this strictly American 
force was not included within the North American Air Defense Command. 
In their military planning American strategists regarded SAC and NORAD 
as the two halves of a powerful and J1Utually conaplinlentary o!.fensive-
defensive team. Nonetheless, many Canadians still felt that the NORAD 
agreement as it stood might arbitrarily bind them to involvement in an 
American war. 
This rear or being drawn into an unwanted war touched closely to 
another paramount concern of most Canadians. This concern arose over 
rear of a possible loss or Canadian sovereignty. Since the Second World 
War, Canadian nationalism had become more persistent, and Canadian 
foreign policy in part reflected this upsurge or national feeling. 
Canadians had no desire to find the recently- eradicated British in­
fiuence replaced by American infiuence, and in 19$7 the NORAD agreement 
appeared to many Canadians both inside and outside the governaent to be 
10 
"NORAD: Defense or a Continent, 11 !!!!!, LXX (November 25, 
1957), 67. 
Air University Staff, Organization for National Security 
(Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University, 1962), PP• 89.90. 
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tangible evidence that such an event was in the process of coming about. 
As the infiuential Toronto Globe and Mail stated: "It would be truly 
catastrophic if, in the name of defence, we threw away--or even appeared 
to throw awq-the eonreignty we are supposed to be defending. n12 The 
fear or losing Canadian sovereignty thus was injected into the NORAD 
dispute and this highl7 charged emtional factor served only to increase 
the amount or controYersy surrounding the agreement. 
Proponents of the "loss of sovereigntytt argument rarely mentioned 
the fact that a Canadian was always to be second in command of NORAD and 
that Canadian officers would comm.and four or the nine regional areas or 
the command, including some which contained American units . 13 Within 
the military establishment, at least, it appeared to many Americans 
that Canadians had been granted more authority than was actually' 
warranted. The soYereignty issue, as far as it concerned the early 
warning sites in Canada, died in 19S9 when the United States announced 
it would tum over command of all the sites it controlled to Canada.14 
While the facts seem to indicate that no devious plot was ever being 
fonnulated in the United States to take over Canadian territocy, and 
that there was little chance that such territory- Jllight inadvertently 
slip under American control, the soTereignty questioDi has continued to 
12Preaton1 .21?• �· , P• lh7 • 
13:rred Alexander, Canadians and Foreign Policy (Toronto: 
Toronto University Press, 1960), p."'liJi. 
l.Jiibid. 
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plague the NORAD pact since its beginning in 1957 . While the discontent 
is not as widespread in Canada now as it was in the late 1950 1 s, it 
still remains a factor affecting the overall NORAD situation. 
Since the inception of the North American A.d.r Defense Coaand, 
Canadians have found cause to complain about the disposition of its 
defense forces. Canadians have been inclined. to view NORAD as being 
intended primarily to defend the bases ot the Strategic Air Command, 
and since these bases are all in the United States rather than in 
Canada, the latter supposedly has been regarded as a peripheral area.15 
.A.ctual.17, an examination of NORAD ' s  air defense system would show this theory 
to be untrue since most of it is deployed for the defense of the continent ' s  
16 
most important cities and industrial centers. In an attempt to allq 
Canadian fears, the U.S. Department of Defense, upon recommendation of 
the Senate Armed Services Sub-committee, studied the feasibility of 
moving several Bomarc missile sites from the United States to Canada, but 
the expense of relocation proved prohibitive.17 Later, however, two 
Bc,marc sites were established on Canadian soil. 
The question of nuclear weapons has troubled the NORAD alliance 
since 1957. The United States has always regarded nuclear warheads on 
its air defense weapons as necessary to insure the destruction of most 
15Preaton, £1?• cit. , P• 145. 
16.11r University Sta.ff, �· �., P• $0. 
17P.reston, �· �., P• 14,. 
18 or an attacking Soviet bomber force. Thus, American forces in the 
North American Air Defense Command have always been equipped with 
nuclear weapons as a matter or military policy. Their existence is 
24 
taken for granted by both the .American government and public. Contrary 
to the United States government 's desire to equip NORAD forces with 
nuclear weapons, the Canadian government balked for a long time on making 
a decision permitting its forces to be supplied with such weapons . 
During the earlJr years or NORAD in the late 1950 1 s, several talks 
had taken place between the United States and Canada on the defense sys­
tem and nu.clear weapons. With the cancellation on February 20, 1959 of 
the Arrow interceptor program, Canada was left without a nuclear weapons 
delivery syst8Jll of its own.19 Canada then asked the United States to 
build two Bomaro ground-to-air missile bases in Canada which had 
previously been planned for sites in upper New York and Michigan. The 
United States agreed to the move and, in addition, paid for the 
construction costs. 20 Talks between the two nations followed in which 
Canadians assured Americans that their country would accept nuclear war­
heads for the missiles, and Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker 
stressed in a House or Commons speech on February 20, 1959 that "the 
full potential of these defensive weapons is achieved only when they 
18 Air University Sta.tr, .2£• �. , P•  91. 
l9peter c .  Newman, Renegade in Power: !a! Diefenbaker Years 
(Nev York t Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1963), P •  3L,8. 
20Ibid., PP• 348-349. 
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are armed with nuclear warheads. n 21 A later agreement followed on May 
25, 1959 whereby both countries agreed to an "exchange of nuclear in­
formation for mutual defence,"  and Canadian troops were to be trained 
in the use of nuclear weapons.22 But nowhere had Canada formally con­
sented in writing to arm its defense forces with nuclear weapons. 
Difficulties soon arose over section 92 or the United States 
Atomic Energy Act, which specifically required that atomic warheads 
could not be transferred out of American custody. This restriction 
angered many Canadians, and the Canadian government delq-ed aaking a 
decision on accepting nuclear warheads. 23 In February, 1962 the 
Canadian Bomarc missile bases were completed, but they remained useless 
because Canada still had not acquired nuclear weapons. Likewise, in 
June, 1962 Canada obtained sixty-four CF-lOlB jet interceptors from the 
United States which also lacked a nuclear capability because of the 
Canadian government 's continued failure to acquire nuclear weapons.24 
This policy disagreement between the two countries continued until the 
Cuban missile crisis of October, 1962, with NORAD forces in the United 
States being fully equipped with nuclear weapons and those in Canada 
being equipped either with conventional warheads or sand ballast . This 
21 ., .. 
�., P• .)&,1,9• 
22Ibid. 
,2.3Ibid. , P• 3SO .  
24Ibid., PP• 350-351 .  
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policy on nuclear weapons also extended to Canadian forces stationed in 
Europe assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
While the Canadian govermnent was not satisfied with the desire 
of the United States to retain custody over warheads, a more important 
issue was actually at the base ot the disagreement: 
The opposition to nuclear weapons reflected the persistent 
Canadian anxiety to make some useful contribution beyond the Cold 
War to the cause of world order. This urge was confused by argu­
ments of dubious logic and morality, but behind it was a convic­
tion that, regardless of who retained ultimate con}tol, as few 
countries as possible should have nuclear weapons. 5 
The Canadian government, while willing to cooperate with the 
United States in the NORAD alliance, appeared to want to restrict its 
role to manning radar sites and maintaining a conventional weapons sys­
tem and leave the nuclear role to the United States. While this fact 
might seem to reflect a large degree of trust by Canada in the protection 
of the United States, it actually demonstrated more accurately Canada ' s  
hope of being able to play an important part in helping to bring about 
some form of nuclear weapons disannament by retraining from accepting 
such weapons on its own soil. Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, on 
February 26, 1962, stated : 11We take the stand that in the interests of 
disarmament, everything must be done to assure success if it can be 
attained, and the nuclear family' should not be increased so long as there 
is arry possibility of disarmament among the nations of the world . tt26 
25 
John w. Holmes, "Canada in Search of Its Role, " Foreign 
Affairs, XLI (July, 1963), 662. 
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The Diefenbaker government's  attitude toward atomic warheads re­
mained unchanged., and in October., 1962 NORAD was faced with a crisis of 
major proportions during the confrontation between the United States 
and the Soviet Union over the attempt by the latter to introduce 
offensive missiles into Cuba. Difficulties arose between the United 
States and Canada when Prime Minister Diefenbaker refused to permit 
nuclear armed American NORAD interceptors and SAC bombers to land at 
forward bases in Canada. In addition, Canadian forces assigned to 
NORAD were not permitted to reach the necessary alert status antil two 
days after the crisis had begun. Diefenbaker gave as his reason for 
this delay and inaction the fact that the United States had chosen only 
to "inform" Canada of its decisions in the Cuban crisis when the NORAD 
agreement actually- provided for a full discussion of the situation be­
fore any decisions were reaohed. 27 
When Canada finally did act in accord with NORAD policy, it was 
largely a meaningless gesture. The Royal Canadian Air Force 's sixty-f'our 
CFlOl•B fighters had no nuclear warheads on the missiles with which they 
were to attack Soviet bombers and the fifty-six Boma.ro missiles guarding 
Canada's heartland were useless because they, too, lacked atomic war-
28 
heads. The Canadian cabinet was hopelessly split because of the 
nuclear weapons q\lestion, and three ministers, Douglas Harlmess, Pierre 
Serlgny, and George Hees eventually resigned their cabinet posts because 
21�. , pp. 338-339 . 
28Ibid., P•  34].. 
of Diefenbaker 's failure to obtain nuclear warheads for weapons which 
Canada already owned. 29 
28 
The Diefenbaker government ' s  failure to carry out its commitments 
to obtain atomic warheads provided an issue for the Liberal opposition 
led by Lester B .  Pearson. Originally, Pearson had been an exponent of 
a non-nuclear role for Canada, but diplo:raatic (and political) considera­
tions led him to change his mind. He regarded the verbal agreements 
Canada ma.de with the United States as binding and stated: "As a 
Canadian, I am ashamed if we accept commitments and then refuse to dis­
charge them. n30 
The debate in Canada continued for some time, and on January 30, 
1963 the United States Department of State released a rather surprising 
and controversial statement declaring: "The Canadian government has not 
yet proposed any arrangement sufficiently practical to contribute 
effectively to North American defense. ,,3l The American statement was 
prompted by Canada 's  continued refusal to conduct negotiations toward 
acquiring nu.clear weapons, but it was widely interpreted in Canada as 
an attempt to meddle in Canadian internal politics because of the in­
tense debate then going on in Canada. 32 One week af'ter the release at 
�, 2e• cit. , P •  65 • 
.31:ri,id., P• 64 . 
32Ibid. 
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the statement the Diefenbaker government fell, and the nuclear weapons 
question became a pa.ramunt issue in the election campaign which 
featured the Diefenbaker Conservatives calling for increased independence 
f'rom the United States and the Pearson Liberals appealing for co­
operation with America. The Liberal Party won the election but only as 
a minority government, and Prime Minister Pearson began negotiations 
with the United States on the acquisition of' atomic warheads. An agree­
ment was reached and went into effect before the end of' 1963, but the 
33 
details of the agreement were not disclosed . 
With the termination of the dispute between Canada and the United 
States over the question of nuclear weapons, the most controversial issue 
surrounding the North American Air Defense Comm.and was settled. Nonethe­
less, other problems discussed earlier have not been completely 
alleviated. Yet it appears that Canadian and American policies in regard 
to their mutual defense system have converged into one unified policy-­
at least on the surface . Another crisis might bring forth other problems 
in the future which are unforeseen at the present time. Nevertheless, 
the past policies of the two countries regarding NORAD illustrate the 
basic attitudes each holds toward foreign affairs in · the Cold War era 
in general. The United States views the NORAD pact todq, as always, as 
a necessary defense arrangement for the North American continent. It is 
not a Tery significant or well known defense pact as far as American 
foreign policy is concerned, and it is far eclipsed in importance by 
.33 Ibid. , P• 6.5 . 
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such alliances as NATO, SEATO, and the OAS . The United States continues 
to regard the Soviet nuclear threat as real and for this reason desires 
the continuation o! the present NORAD defense system . Canada, on the 
other hand, regards the Soviet nuclear threat in a much less serious 
light and has continually sought ways of lessening Cold War tensions. 
At times either significant segments of the Canadian population or the 
Canadian government itself has looked upon NORAD as an unwanted and un­
warranted threat to Canadian sovereignty, an invitation to involvement 
in American wars, and a potential barrier to nuclear disarmament. None­
theless, in the broader sense both countries have regarded the North 
American Air Defense Command as a necessary defense pact for the Cold 
War, and despite differences of opinion, it continues to exist. 
CHAPTER IV 
CUBA 
Events in Cuba since the victorious revolution of Fidel Castro in 
January, 19S9 have been of great importance to both the United States 
and Canada. The Cuban issue was mentioned briefly in the NORAD pact dis­
cussion earlier in reference to the 1962 missile crisis, but attitudes of 
Canada and the United States toward Cuba go much deeper than what was 
evidenced in the last few dqs of October, 1962. 
Prior to 194S, Canadian foreign policy had for the most part 
ignored all of Latin America. "This was part� through the indifference 
of most Canadians, part� through a preference for Commonwealth ties and 
European cultural interests, and partly through the feeling that Latin 
America was a United States sphere of interest in which it was better not 
to interfere. •1 Canada did not join the Organization 01' American States 
because of the lack of rltal interests in South America and initial 
opposition to Canadian membership on the part of the United States.
2 
United States policies in regard to Latin .America in general dur­
ing the Cold War period has continued mu.ch along traditional lines sup­
ported by the Monroe Doctrine and supplemented with grants of foreign aid 
\ichard A. Preston, Canada in World Affairs : 1959-1961 
(Toronto: Oxford University Press,19o5'J';-p. 175. 
2 .!!!!!!•, p. 176. 
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in various forms and amounts. As with its foreign policy in general, 
American Latin American policy was geared primarily toward the prevention 
or communist takeovers 1n any Latin American nation. The overthrov of a 
leftist regime in Guatemala in 1954 which was engineered by the Central 
Intelligence Agency serves as an excellent illustration of' this policy. 
This overall situation of' American involvement and Canadian un­
involvement still existed at the time or the Castro revolution. In both 
Canada and the United States, there was considerable sympathy f'or Fidel 
Castro in the earl3 stages of' his revolutionary- activities . He was widely 
regarded as a reformer as opposed to dictator Fulgencio Batista who was 
tolerated but not particularl.1' well liked in either country of North 
America. Soon after gaining power, Castro visited the United States 
where he was treated to great ovations and offered substantial amounts 
or foreign aid. The sympathetic attitude and assurances of support from 
the United States did not prove to be long lasting, however. The execution 
of' over six hundred Cuban political prisoners in 19591 the expropriation 
without compensation of' an estimated one billion dollars worth of' 
American-owned property, and a "perceptible gravitation toward the 
Communist bloc" combined to change .American attitudes from sympathy to 
outright opposition.4 Relations between Cuba and the United States con­
tinued to deteriorate in the summer and fall of' 1960 with the pronollllcements 
3s&111Uel Eliot Morison, The Oxford History of the American People 
(Hew York : Oxtord University Presa, 196S), p. 10�.-
hcecil V. Crabb., Jr • ., American Foreign Policy ,!!! _!:!!!  Nuclear � 
(second edition; New York : Harper and Row, 1965), p. 292. 
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of friendship between the Soviet Union and Cuba against American 
•imperialism" ; the extending of military aid to Cuba b7 communist states; 
a United States-imposed trade embargo on Cuban products;  and the reduction 
of the Cuban quota of sugar imported by the United States.5 Finally, the 
Eisenhower administration severed diplomatic relations with Cuba on 
January 3, 1961; two years and two days after the accession to power of 
Fidel Castro. 
By the end of President Eisenhower' s  term of office, the United 
States had reached a decision to rid the hemisphere of Castro. The newly­
installed Kennedy administration seconded the Eisenhower decision, and on 
April 17, 1961, an American-trained and supported force of 1,500 anti-
. 
6 
Castro Cuban exiles invaded the ;sland state at the Bay of Pigs. Half-
hearted American efforts, faulty tactics, and decided:cy' inferior invasion 
forces doomed the invasion to failure resulting in a serious diplomatic 
defeat for the United States.7 The military failure of the expedition 
was grave enough but the unfortunate turn of events proved particularly 
embarrassing in view of the Kennedy administration's public statements in 
regard to the Cuban situation. Both President Kenne<tr and the State De­
partment had . maintained that the United States ' would take no part in any 
military operation directed against the Castro government but that the 
5Ibid.,  pp. 292-293. 
6w:tm .. P. Gerberding, United States Foreign �f cy: Pers;eectives 
and Analysis (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Comp&n7, 19 , P• 270. 
7Morison, �· cit.,  p. 1117 . 
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United States supported the aspirations of the Cuban people in their de­
sire to rid their country of Castro ' s  dictatorial regime.
8 
This full cycle of American relations with Castro Cuba was not 
followed by Canada. As in the United States, there was considerable 
sympathy in Canada for Fidel Castro after his seizure of power on 
January 1, 1959. But since Canada, unlike the United States, was not 
deeply involved in Cuban affairs either through political or economic 
ties, it was not particular:cy- concerned with the events which took place 
inside the country in the early period of Castro ' s  rule. Its diplomatic 
ties with Cuba continued in the same manner as allRQ"S, and it mattered 
little to Canada the methods used by Castro to gain power or the fate of 
· his political opponents. 9 Cuban flirtations with the Soviet Union were 
largely ignored by Canada in her dealings with Cuba. Successive 
nationalizations by the Castro government of foreign-owned propert;r--most 
of which was American--had little effect upon Canada because Canadian 
businessmen had invested very little in Cuba with the exception of 
several banking and insurance companies. When the Cuban government 
· issued the decrees of October 13, 1960 nationalizing all foreign-owned 
banks, Canadian banks, with an estimated one hundred miilion dollars in 
assets were purposely omitted from nationalization because the Castro 
Bai.chard P. Stebbins (ed.), Documents on American Foreign 
Relations, 1961 (lev Yorlc: Harper Brothers Company, 1962), pp. 455-456 . 
9Edvard McWhinney, · 11Canadian-United s·ta tes Commercial Relations 
and International Law," Canada-United States Treaty Relations, ed. David 
R. Deener (Durham, N.  C. : Duke University- Press, 1963), p .  !40. 
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government "did not want to offend the Canadian government. 1110 Thus, 
Canada was able to avoid, at least for the time being, the lossess which 
investors in the United States and other countries suffered. This Cuban 
action toward Canadian interests was not taken because of arf3' love for 
Canada but rather was intended to keep the door open to future trade 
deals with Canada. 
When the United States imposed an embargo on all trade with Cuba 
except foodstuffs and medical supplies on October 19, 1960, in retalia­
tion for the uncompensat�d Cuban expropriation of American-owned 
property, Canad.a was faced with immediate problems of a delicate nature. 
Because of her close trading ties with the United States, Canada could 
render the American embargo almost useless by agreeing to trade goods 
to Cuba which the latter could no longer obtain from the United States. 11 
Discussions between the United States and Canada followed almost 
immediately in which "the Canadian government from the first took the 
stand that American goods covered by the embargo should not be allowed 
to reach Cuba by way of Canada. n12 This decision on Canada's part 
should not be interpreted as an indication of that nation's agreement with 
the American embargo. John Holmes, a respected Canadian political 
an�t and sometime Canadian government otticial, gave this view of 
Canada's feelings in regard to the embargo and its usefulness: 
10rbid., P• 137. 
�••ton, ..2E• �., p. 180. 
In the Canadian view, however, these embargoes are unwise and 
unilateral. Canadians have been less inclined than Americana to 
see the overthrow of communist regimes as a feasible aim and have 
been more disposed, therefore, to hope that the beneficient in­
fluence of connnerce would eventual'.13 erode barriers 8i1 create 
on both sides vested interests in peaceful relations. 
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Despite the Canadian-United States discussions on the American 
embargo and Canadian assurances that she would not serve as a go-between 
!or American made products desired by Cuba, ill-feelings were generated 
in both countries . A ten man Cuban trade mission headed by the Cuban 
Minister of Econom.y, Regino Boti, arrived in (?ttawa in December, 1960 to 
discuss the purchase by Cuba of an estimated $1$01000,000 worth of goods 
from Canada on a cash basis. A wide range of i terns was desired mclud­
ing: "automotive and tractor spare parts, raw materials !or bottle manu­
facturing, caustic soda, replacement parts for sugar mills, special types 
of lubricants, and petroleum refinery- equipment. •14 Since much of this 
purchase list was included in the American embargo, the trade discussions 
were greeted with mixed feelings in the United States. As one American 
official told the Toronto Globe and Mail on December 14, 1960, Canada 
seemed "1*>re interested in making a few bucks than thwarting the Reds 
in the Caribbean. n1' Fortunate'.q', the differences in trade policies 
between the two North American countries did not approach serious 
13John w. Holmes, "The Relationship in Alliance and in World 
Affairs,"  The United States and Canada, ed. John s.  Dickey (Englewood 
Clif'fs, N .J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc . ,  1964), pp. 118-1�9 .  
"ircWhirmey, �· s!•, p .  137. 
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proportions because Prime Minister Diefenbaker closed a:rry- possible gaps 
which might haTe permitted Cuba to have obtained American-made products 
from Canada. The Boti trade mission proposals were permitted to die, 
and Canadian trade with Cuba actual.l1' declined rather than expanded in 
16 the next year. 
With the cessation of diplomatic relations between the United 
States and Cuba on January 3, 1961, Canadian and American foreign poliq 
again diverged. The United States felt that such action was justified 
and might, in £act, help to bring about the eventual downfall of the 
Castro government. The Canadian government, however, did not believe 
that a break in relations was warranted and that such action would not 
help bring about Castro' s downfall. Canada was by no means happy over 
Cuba's dealings with the communist bloc or its uncompensated expropria­
tions which had, by this time, reached Canadian property; the lone ex­
ception being Canadian-owned banks which were purchased by the Cuban 
goTernm.ent.
17 But the Canadian government felt that Castro was not 
entirely to blame £or his policies :  
As both Mt-. Diefenbaker and the Canadian press suggested, 
Canadian policy was based on the belief that Castro's drift 
to Moscow had been at least partiail1' caused by a mistaken 
American policy. It was thought th.at maintenance of normal 
diplomatic and economic relations by C�ftda might help to 
preserve some Cuban ties with the West . 
16 Ibid., p. ]Jµ.. 
17 Preston, �· _ill., PP• 180-181 . 
18Ibid., p. 180. 
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Edward McWhinney, a professor at the University of Toronto, feel� 
that this difference in approach toward diplomatic relations with Cuba 
by the two nations is a result of differences in legal traditions rather 
than isolated policy decisions: 
American international law doctrine., much more than Canadian, 
which is more essential� English-derived, so often combines 
essent� pragmatist-based positions with strong doses of 
natural law thinking. The normative type propositions., for 
example, found in what we might call "American" intemational 
law attitudes--the Stimson doctrine or the duty of non-recognition 
of international situations brought about by "illegal" use of 
force, invoked so often in cormection with American thinking on 
such matters as the issue of recognition or non-recognition have 
no strict counterparts or parallels in the inttvi•tional law 
doctrine of the Conunonweal th countries per se . 
Thus, some have argued that Canada., 1n addition to believing that 
the United States was not justified in breaking relations with Cuba, 
utilized an international law policy quite different from that of the 
United States in that it gave little consideration to questions of 
international morality in maintaining diplomatic relations with another 
government. This particular argument put forth by McWhinney and others 
as a reason for Canadian recognition of the Castro regime has had its 
exceptions for Canada in other parts of the globe, however, as will be 
indicated later in this study. 
The break in relations between the United States and Cuba was soon 
followed in April by the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion. This contro­
versial expedition has been mch discussed in the United States since 
19 
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its occUITence, and the consensus of opinion is that for various reasons 
it was a very poor operation on the part of this country. In Canada the 
event was, likewise, widely publicised and debated, but the government, 
possibly in deference to its neighbors to the south, chose to sq little 
publicl3 on the subject. It was clearly anxious to avoid embarrassing 
the United States.20 Prime Minister Diefenbaker made the following 
statement on April 19, 1961, outlining Canada ' s  position on the Cuban 
situation : 
It is now clear the situation in Cuba is mch more than a 
continuation of the original internal revolution • • • • 
Cuba has become ti:ie focal point of an ideological contest • 
• • • In our country we cannot be indifferent
2i
o this danger 
which affects the hemisphere in which we live. 
This statement actually brought the Diefenbaker government a long way 
toward agreeing with the American position that Cuba was plqing the 
role of a Soviet satellite in the Western hemisphere and that it was 
the base tor subverting other free nations in the area. A statement 
released by the State Department on April 31 1961, just before the Bq 
of Pigs invasion, gave the United States position on the Castro govern-
ment : 
What began as a movement to enlarge Cuban democracy and free­
dom has been perverted, in short, into a mechanism for the_ 
destruction of free institutions in Cuba, for the seizure by 
international communism of a base and bridgehead in the Americas 
and £or the disruption of the inter-American system. 
20John T. Sqwell, Canadian Annual Review for 1961 (Toronto : 
University of' Toronto Press, 1962)1 P• 12S. -
-
It is the considered judgment or the Government of the United 
States of America that the Castro regime :in Cuba offers a clear 
and present danger to the authentic and autonomous revolution of 
the Americas--to the whole hope of spreading political liberty, 
economic development., and social progress through all the re­
publics or the hemisphere.22 
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Thus., while Canada did not give official support to the Bq of 
Pigs operation., its general poliey--at least � regard to its assessment 
of that country as a potential comnnmist threat--became more similar to 
the policy or the United States. Considerable debate followed within 
the House or Commons and the cabinet and also in the news media, but 
aside from the public statement given by Prime Minister Diefenbaker, all 
other comnnmications between the United States and Canada were of an un­
publicized nature on the diplomatic levei.
23 
An interesting result or the Bay of Pigs episode :f'rom the Canadian 
standpoint has been that the controversial event., as well as the Panama 
Canal riots and the Dominican Republic turmoil, has been pointed to by 
many Canadians as proof that Canada should remain outside the Organiza­
tion or American States to prevent that country from becoming embroiled 
in diplomatic predicaments which might require the condemnation of the 
United States.24 
The Bq of' Pigs episode ended with Canada and the United States 
in general agreement on the potential threat posed by Cuba as a conmmnist 
22 Stebbins, �· cit., P• 438. 
23 
Sqwell., �· ill•, P• 126. 
21'oerald Clark, Canada: The Uneasy Neighbor (Hew York : David 
McKay Company', 1965), P• 64. 
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satellite in the Western hemisphere. Yet Canada was not prepared to 
take any action towards countering this threat as the .United States had 
in such areas as diplomatic relations, the embargo, and undercover aid 
to anti-Castro Cuban refugees. From the period following the Bay of 
Pigs invasion to the Cuban ·missile crisis of October, 1962, nothing of' 
significance occurred which ma.teria.ll.3 affected the foreign policy of' 
either country-. 
The Cuban missile crisis which public:cy, began with President 
Kennedy' s  nationwide television speech of October 22, 1962, brought re-
newed strains between Canada and the United States in connection with the 
Cuban problem. These differences arose not onl1' over Cuban policy in general 
but also revolved about Canadian and United States defense arrangements. 
The United States viewed the importation of' long range missiles 
and ll-28 bombers into Cuba by the Soviet Union as being in violation of' 
the Monroe Doctrine and as posing a direct threat not onq to Latin 
American nations but to the United States as well. Both weapons were of 
an offensive character and possessed nuclear capabilities. The medium 
range ballistic missiles· had a range enabling them to strike targets as 
25 
f'ar north as Hudson I s Bay and as far south as Lima, Peru. Clearly, the 
entire hemisphere was placed in danger . 
In order to prohibit the permanent introduction of' these weapons 
into Cuba, the United States undertook several actions. American naval 
units initiated a blockade of Cuba to bar ships from delivering more of 
2S.r1son, �· �., P• lll7. 
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these weapons , and American forces at Guantanom.o Bay naval base in Cuba 
were reinforced. Emergency meetings were called ot the Organization of 
American States and the United Nations Security Council. Soviet Premier 
Nikita Khrushchev was warned that it would be American policy nto regard 
arrr nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western 
hemisphere as an attack ·by the Soviet Union on the United States , re­
quiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union. n26 Along with 
this warning went the ttrequest" to remove all offensive weapons already 
in Cuba. For several days a tense world awaited the showdown between the 
United States and the Soviet Union which was expected to de"Yelop when 
.American naval blockade forces would · have to halt Russian freighters 
delivering weapons to Cuba. The United States presented its case before 
the Security Council with an extraordinary display of' photographs taken 
b;y reconnaissance planes, and the Organization of American States , by 
unanimous vote on October 23, "demanded the immediate and total dis­
mantling of comnamist missiles in Cuba and called upon its members to 
resist, by force ii' necessary, &rt3" further Cuban importation of com­
munist arms .•27 
It was not until. October 27 that the crisis eased. On that date 
the Soviet freighters bo1md for Cuba turned around and headed back to 
the U. s .  s .  R. , and Premier Khrushchev sent a conciliatory note to 
President Kennedy- indicating he wished to avoid provocations against 
26 Gerberding, 21?.• �. , p .  274. 
27crabb, .5!2• �. , P• 294. 
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the United States and would withdraw the missiles and n-28 bombers 
from Cuba. On November 20, President Kenned;r announced that all com­
munist missiles 1n Cuba ·had been dismantled and were being removed, and 
. 
28 
the American naval blockade or the island was being lifted. 
During the crisis the United States received considerable support 
from its allies around the world who, whether they agreed with America's 
general Cuban policy or not, wanted to declare their support for the 
United States in what appeared to be a possible showdown confrontation 
with the communist ·world.29 Canada., however, whose interests coincided 
most closeq of all with those of the United States·, procrastinated in 
determining its course of action in the crisis. Prime Minister John 
Diefenbaker failed to grant immediate permission for American planes 
to move forward to bases at Goose Bay., Labrador, and Stephenville, 
Newfoundland, or to make flights over Canadian territory after being 
urgent� requested. to do so several hours before President Kenned;r' s 
dramatic speech of October 22, 1962. The reason he later gave for his 
refusal was based on the failure of the United States to consult with 
the Canadian government about the proposed course of action as specified 
30 
by the North American ilr Defense Command agreement. The Royal 
Canadian Air Force contingents under NORAD were not permitted to come up 
29oerberd.1ng, �· ill•., P• 274. 
30peter c.  Newman, Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years 
(Nev York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 'inc • ., 1963)., p.  3)9. 
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to the necessary alert status until amost two days had passed in the 
crisis., and even after these forces had been put on alert, obstacles 
were placed in the way of the United States in its attempts to provide 
adequate protection for the North American c·ontinent. The Strategic 
Air Command which reportedly' had requested permission to make 640 over­
flights of nuclear-armed bombers over Canadian territory finally was 
allowed to make only- eight such flights.31 
This failure of Canada to act in a crisis situation which could 
have affected her just as much as it could the United States might well 
have had disastrous results if an actual conflict had developed with the 
Soviet Union. Fortunateq such a situation did not occur., but Canada's 
initial delay in cooperating with the United States was not reassuring 
for the latter and had repercussions in Canada, as discussed earlier, 
with the fall of Prime Minister Diefenbaker ' s  government being the end 
product. 
During the crisis itself., Diefenbaker ' s  cabinet was split badl,1' 
on what action to take. Howard Green, then Minister of Extern.al Affairs, 
urged a policy of no cooperation whatsoever with the United States with 
an emotional cry for Canadian independence. Douglas Harkness, the De­
fense Minister, spoke out for supporting American actions in the crisis. 
Diefenbaker initially took Green ' s  position, but three days later altered 
his stand and stated in the House of Co:mmns: "So that the attitude of 
the government will be clearly understood, we intend to support the 
31Ib1d., P• 340. -
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United States and our allies in this situation. •32 However, the damage 
had alread;y been done to Diefenbaker and his government, and his later 
words rang somewhat hollow in light of his early- actions. His govem­
ment eventually- fell as a result of' the Cuban missile crisis and its 
related issues, and after the general elections Diefenbaker joined 
the opposition instead of the government. 
Since the missile crisis of October, 1962 there has been little 
conflict between United States · and Canadian foreign policy in regard to 
the Cuban situation. No incidents have arisen which have altered sig­
nificantly the policies of either of the two governments. The United States 
still has no diplomatic relations with Cuba and a trade embargo continues 
in effect except for certain medical supplies which are. permitted to go 
to Cuba as always. The United States has publicl.Jr refused to permit 
anti-Castro Cubans from launching attacks against the island, and 
throughout 1966 has maintained an airlift between Cuba and Florida to 
bring Cuban refugees to this country. Canada continues to engage in some 
trade with Cuba but such trade is not great and is limited to items not 
embargoed by' the United States. In 196�, the total trade between the two 
nations amounted to approximately- $64, 000, 000 worth of goods.
33 Canada 
also continues to maintain diplomatic relations with the Castro regime. 
The earq differences of opinion between the United States and Canada 
32Ibid., P• 339 • 
.33c. J. Harris (ed. ), Quick Canadian Facts (Toronto : Thorn 
Press, 1965), P • 86. 
regarding Cuba polic7 have not been entire� overcome, but the status 
quo methods of handling the regime of Fidel Castro will no doubt be 
accepted by both nations until some meaningful event occurs which 
signif'icantq alters the Cuban question. 
46 
CHAPTER V 
THE NORTH ATIANTIC 'l'REATY ORGANIZATION 
The formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in A.pril, 
1949 marked the beginning of a new and vital issue in the field of 
foreign affairs for both the United States and Canada. Since NATO's 
formation the European foreign policies of both nations have been 
determined, to a large extent, by alliance considerations . Prior to 
NATO, Canada's policies in Europe were carried out in conjunction with 
those of' Great Britain to a considerable degree. As an influential 
member of the Commonwealth, it had taken Great Britain's lead in dealing 
with the European states, and a strict'.cy Canadian policy had not yet 
evolved.1 
The United States, in the years between the end of World War II 
and the formation of' NATO, had directed a considerable portion of its 
imagination and resources toward rebuilding Europe, and in response to 
the Soviet threat it had dropped its traditional pre-war policy of 
isolationisa. It viewed a free Western Europe as being a prerequisite 
for preserving a free United States. The Marshall Plan, the Berlin Air­
lift, the Vandenburg Resolution, and President Truman's Point Four 
Program all were indications of America's strong interest and involvement 
in Western Europe and served as antecedents for United States melllbership 
1Melvin Conant, "Canada's Role in Western Defense, " Foreign 
Affairs, n (April, 1962 ),  432.433 . 
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in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Nonetheless, even with this 
previous involvement in European affairs, the formation ot NATO has been 
regarded by many as the point of departure for the new American policy 
in Europe. 
Both Canada and the United States were instrumental in bringing 
about the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
Canadian leaders were probably the first to propose the idea of setting 
up such an organization. They viewed it as a positive way of helping to 
create a prosperous, viable Europe capable of countering comuamist sub­
version or invasion. On June ll, 1948, the very day the United States 
Senate was approT.ing the Vandenburg Resolution urging the nation to 
underwrite the costs of collective defense arrangements under the United 
Nations Charter., Prime Minister St. Laurent was telling the Canadian 
House of Commons: 
The best guarantee of peace today' is the creation and preserva­
tion by the nations of the free world, under the leadership of 
Great Britain, the United States ., and France, of an overwhelming 
preponderance of force over any adversary or possible combination 
of adversaries. This force
2
mu.st not only be military; it must be 
economic; it must be moral. 
In addition to protecting Europe, however., Canada viewed a strong North 
Atlantic communit7 as a great aid in maintaining Canadian independence 
from the United States which, even prior to 1949, had grown progressive:cy­
more influential in Canada as Great Britain grew weak:er.
3 
2w. E. c .  Harrison ., Canada in World Affairs: 1949-1950 (Toronto : 
Oxford University Press, 1957), p.22. 
3John w. Holmes, "Canada in Search of Its Role, 11 Foreign Affairs, 
XLI (JuJ.7, 1963 ) ., 121. 
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The United States desire in establishing NATO, of course, was not 
influenced in any way by a need to offset Canadian influence in American 
affairs. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in a radio speech on March 18, 
1949, outlined the American desire for a NATO pact: 
We have learned our history lessons from two world wars in less 
than half a century-. That experience has taught us that the con­
trol of Europe by a single, unfriendly power would constitute an 
intolerable threat to the national security of the United States. 
We participated in these two great wars to preserve the integrity 
and independence of the European half of the Atlantic community 
in order to pr�serva the integrity and independence of the 
American half. 
Secretary Acheson went on to state that the Atlantic pact was a collective 
self-defense arrangement ttaimed at coordinating the exercise of the right 
of self defense especia� recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter. •5 The United States viewed NATO, therefore, as not supplanting 
the United Nations as some people feared at the time but rather comple­
menting the organization and giving the international order some tangible 
support in an area of vital concern. 
It is interesting to note how close Canadian and American policy 
coincided on both the importance of Europe to North American defense and 
the supplementary role which NATO would p]JQr to the United Nations with­
in Article 51 of the Charter. In discussing the need for the alliance, 
Prime Minister St. Laurent stressed Europe' s importance to North America 
in mu.ch the same manner as �ecretary of State Acheson : 
1asct.rarc1 Reed, Readings for Democrats (New York : Oceana Publica­
tions, Inc . ,  1960), p. 167 . 
-
.Sibid., p. 186. 
We in Canada also recognize that there is neither peace nor 
security .for Canada if Western Europe, quite as nm.ch as any part 
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o.f this hemisphere, is in danger; but we .feel that, by uniting our 
efforts, by making our intentions clear, by making our preparations 
serious, and by' .forcing the totalitarian rulers or the Communist 
states to realize that we mean
6
business, we are not· contracting 
our strength but expanding it. 
Like the United States, Canada .felt that NATO was sanctioned 
under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. St. Laurent again 
stated : "Without sacrificing the universality of the United Nations, it 
is possible for the free nations o.f the world to .form their own closer 
association for collective salt-defense under Article 51 or the Charter 
of the United Nations. n7 
Canada., as the United States, had come to realize that the United 
Nations alone could not provide the final answer for solving all the 
world' s  problems--at least the major ones or the Cold War--and felt that 
NATO was a necessity in preserving Western freedom. Both countries 
shared an equal desire to see NATO provide security for an area which 
each placed primary' importance on, and their attitudes in this respect 
were similar. Canada, however, wanted the NATO alliance .for the 
additional reason of partia.lq offsetting American influence in Canada. 
This second .factor favoring Canadian mem.ber�hip � NATO has proven to 
be of vital importance in Canada' s relations with the North Atlantic 
alliance since 1949. 
'sarrison., El?• cit.,  P• 24. 
7Donald c .  Masters, Canada in World Affairs : 1953-1955 (Toronto: 
Oxford Uni�ersity Press, 19S9)., p.18). 
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Since the beginning, the NATO alliance has been an unequal 
partnership between the United States on the one hand and the other four­
teen member nations on the other . Overwhelming American power, both 
nuclear and conventional, determined this aspect of the pact. Th.is is 
not to say that the United States has alv,qs been in opposition to the 
policies and objectives of the other members or NATO for such has 
definitely not been the case. But a preponderance of American power and 
al.most total nuclear m.onopoq gave to the United States the major 
decision-making role in the alliance. Canada, on the other hand, has 
not been an influential member of the organization. Even though Canada 
is a North American nation, it has allied itself genera.lly- either with 
Britain or, more often, with the smaller European states of NATO. 
Significantly, it has collaborated with the smaller European members in 
resisting all proposals for a great power directorate. 8 In addition, 
Canada has found in NATO the security of numbers which it could not hope 
to find in a strict:cy, bilateral pact with America . 9 NATO has assured 
Canada an opportunity to participate in making decisions which might 
otherwise have been determined in Washington without consulting Canada 
or taking her interests into account. 10 
8c .  P. Stacey, •Twenty-one Years or Military Co-operation,"  
Canada-United States Treffl Relations, ed . David R. Deener (Durham., N. C. :  Duke University Press, 1 3), P•  127 • 
. 9Fred Alexander� Canadians and Foreign Policy (Toronto : Toronto 
University Press, 1960) 1 p. 34. 
10 Ibid., P• 131. 
,2 
These purely Canadian reasons for membership in the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization may appear strange to Americans who have 
never experienced the problem of cont:inualq needing to assert their 
independence from foreign influence as a nation- and as a people. Yet, 
when one examines Canadian history, particularq that of the recent Cold 
War era, Canada's attitudes in regard to NATO coincide closeq with its 
general foreign poliey and its relationship with the United States. 
Canadian membership in NATO has demonstrated that country' s wish to com­
bat the spread of international communism., but it also has signified her 
intentions ot retaining some ties with Mother England and, _to a limited 
degree, with France and, in addition, of using continental Europe as a 
counterweight to .American power and influence. The years since 1949 
indicate that Canada has followed this course of action consistentl..1', but 
its degree or success is rather difficult to ascertain. Canada's voice 
in NATO has never been very signif'icant, and decisions have been made in 
the organization regardless of Canada's acceptance or rejection of them. 
NATO has helped to maintain Canadian ties with Great Britain and France, 
but on this side of the Atlantic American influence in Canada has in­
creased rather than decreased as complaints from many Canadian quarters 
indicate. 
From the J.merican Tiewpoint it is difficult to describe the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization as anything but a success. In its early' 
years it was responsible in large part for preventing a eomnmnist take­
over ot Western Europe, which was the most vital objective of United 
States foreign policy . Along with this objective the alliance played 
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a key role in the rebuilding of Western Europe into the second most 
prosperous area or the world, thus ending its reliance upon large 
amotmts of American financial and technical assistance. Over the long 
term NATO has also contributed to less rivalry and to closer cooperation 
among Westem European nations in spite of the current disruptive 
policies of President Charles De Gaulle. Such organizations as the 
European  Economic Community and Eura tom have been able to function be­
cause of the favorable ataosphere in Europe--created to a large degree 
by NATO. In general, NATO has been a successful instrument or American 
foreign policy, although events of recent years have shown that some of 
the more specific aims of United States foreign policy have been less 
successful within the alliance. 
The same evaluation of NAT0 1 s overall success holds true from 
Canada I s vie11p0int also. As indicated earlier, Cana.da was interested, 
juat as was the United States, in preserving Western European freedom, 
11 
building up its econonv, and reducing inner tensions and distrusts. 
It is with the specific objectives and methods of NATO that Canada has 
not always been satisfied--sometimes for quite opposite reasons than 
the United States. 
Undoubtec::l:cy,, one of the most persistent problems facing the NATO 
alliance, and one which affects it serious:q, at present, is the method 
of leadership ·of the organization. The NATO Secretary-General in con­
junction with the Secretariate; the Foreign Ministers • Conference every 
l
¾w.ters, �· cit., pp. 184-18$ . 
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six months; the NATO parliamentary sessions every _ year; the Standing 
Group; and the Committee on Political Advisors have all been instruments 
established at one time or another as compromise means of making NATO 
policy. Sil}.ce 19.50, however, regardless of these altemate devices, the 
chief polic7-maldng office has been that of the Supreme Allied Commander, 
12 
Europe. This position of power has always been held by an American by 
virtue of the overwhelming milita.17 power of the United States. By 
holding this position in conjunction with its military capabilities, the 
United States has been able to exercise significant and, in many cases, 
controlling authority over NATO policy. This dominance of NATO is deter­
mined to a veey considerable degree by .American nuclear power, and the 
two important issues of control over NATO and control over its nuclear 
arsenal are, in actual�ty, the same problem. This predominance of 
American power and its guarantee to this country of a commanding voice 
in the Atlantic pact has been much to the advantage of the United States. 
In the 1960 1 s United States domination has been challenged in 
various ways by several of the member states of the alliance, with 
France being only" the most outstanding example. · In an attempt to 
assuage the sensitivities of the other members of ·NAT01 the United 
States has cooperated in the various efforts to broaden the decision­
makin� processes of the alliance. The Mu.ltilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) 
idea first proposed under the Eisenhower administration and expanded 
12Michael Curtis., Westem European Integration (New York : 
Harper and Row., Inc • ., 1965)., pp. 78�79.  
upon by President Kennedy is the most recent and best known attempt to 
give more voice to the other fourteen NATO members.
13 These various 
efforts to increase the role of the other m�mbers have been founded on 
the desire of the United States to maintain some control over its 
nuclear veapons--both for political reasons and the legal requirement in 
the form of' the 1946 McMahon Act and its 1958 amendments restricting the 
dissemination of atomic information and weaponry.14 Some tactical 
weapons with nuclear capabilities, such as the Honest John and Corporal 
guided missiles, eight inch howitzers, and jet aircraft, have been 
supplied to other NATO countries . The nuclear warheads for these 
weapons, however, as well as all long range missiles and strategic 
15 
bombers, have been kept under American control. Great Britain, in 
1965, turned its strategic bomber force over to NATO command. These 
actions have not been enough to satisfy France, which has undertaken 
�e task of developing its own n�clear f'orce--the force de frappe. The 
MIF proposal has since been discarded because of the opposition of 
France and some of the smaller NATO members--m&ny' ot whom fear the 
prospect of West Oerm&n7 1 s having a voice in any- decision to use 
16 
nuclear weapons. 
l3w:uuam P. Gerberding, United States Fore
1fl 
i}licz: Perapectbee 
!!!,g .Analysis (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 96 , p. 244. 
l4Ibid. ' p.  245. 
lS Curtis, ..2E• cit., P• BS . 
16 
�., P• 89. 
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With the rejection of the MLF proposals, the United States has 
refrained from introducing any more alternatives to the present method 
of running the alliance . Even though the current arrangement is re­
garded as unsatisfactory by so many members, the present involvement of 
the United States in Vietnam; the chauvinistic attitude of France; and 
the Soviet pre-occupation with internal and eastern matters, mediates 
against any ear� solution to the problem of developing a new and work­
able form of policy-making organ for the NATO alliance. 
Canada has not played a decisive role in these attempts at giving 
the other NATO members a greater share of the decision-making power, but 
it should be noted that Lester B. Pearson, in his various roles through 
the years, has been an important personality in NATO out of proportion 
to what would normally be expected from a representative of Canada. 
First and foremost, Canada has been an uncompromising proponent of the 
NATO alliance. Above all other· issues affecting the North Atlantic 
region, it views the preservation of the NATO pact as a necessity•­
especial:cy, 'When either the North American or the European end appears to 
be on a "go it alone" path. . As far back as 1954, Mr. Pearson, as 
Secretary of State for External Affairs, stated: 
The continuing cohesion of all the Atlantic powers, not mere:cy­
the European powers, is vital.lJ" important to the preserving and 
re-inf'orc:ing of the peace of the world and no security and no 
stability can be achieved through isolated arrangements, either 
in North America or in Europe. Continentalis:ra, whether ¥f the 
European or American variety, is not enough for saf'ety. 1 
17 
Masters, �· cit., P• 185. 
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This Canadian desire to keep NATO together as an effective 
alliance system rather than as a continental or diversified multi-state 
defense system with no joint defense planning has been illustrated in 
the debate over German membership in 19$4 and 19SS., the Suez Invasion or 
19$6., the Cuban Crisis of 1962., and to some degree in the last three 
years when NATO has been faced with severe internal problems. Both 
Prime Minister Pearson at the NATO Council meeting in Mq., 1963 and 
Paul Martin., Secretary or State for Extemal Affairs., in a speech in 
Cleveland on March 4, 196S., reaffirmed Canada' s  deep desire to see NATO 
remain intact and, in fact., join even closer together into a true 
18 Atlantic community. Thus, at a time when the United States and other 
NATO members were embroiled in controversy over the more specific prqb­
lems facing the organization., Canada was not onl,1- pleading the case for 
unity above all else in the alliance., but al�o for the creation of an 
actual community spanning the Atlantic, which would unite the member 
states in something more than a simple military alliance. 
Even in the case of Canada., however., doubts appear to have arisen 
recent:cy- over the f�ture direction of NATO because of the actions of 
France. fllese doubts do not reflect a fundamental change of Canadian 
attitude but, instead, indicate that Canada wishes to do what is best 
and most practical for the organization in its present state. This new 
attitude was brought out in a speech by Prime Minister Pearson to the 
18Paul Martin., "Canada and the Atlantic Community, " External 
Affairs., XVII (April, 1965), 124. 
Canada Club in ottawa on Febru&rT 10, 1965, when he stated : 
We DDJ.St now re-examine the principles on which the Atlantic 
Alliance was follllded 16 years ago. The best result would be to 
come closer together, organicalq, on the old Treaty basis. But 
that is impossible at the moment if we wish to include the France 
of General De Gaulle. And, certainly', in Canada it is impossible 
to contemplate an Atlantic coalition without France. 
ilternativeq, we mq have to consider new arrangements by 
which Europe takes responsibility for the security of one side ot 
the Atlantic, North America for the other, with interloeking19o­operative arrangements for mutual assistance against attack. 
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For Canada the prospects of utilizing this alternate plan would be 
particularly displeasing because her voice would be alone in seeking 
to influence United States policies on this side of the Atlantic, 
whereas she has had numerous allies under the present set-up. Thus 
Canada Jll81' well find that the very instrument which had saved her from 
undue American influence might, indeed, eventually consign her to this 
unwanted fate. 
When specific ideas are considered for solving the problems of 
nuclear control and decision-making authority, Canada has had no more 
success than other members of the alliance. She opposed the creation 
of another triumvirate or "'l'hree Wise Men" in 1956 because the first 
triumvirate had been rather ineffective, and the then recent Suez 
Crisis had indicated that a triumvirate system of the type envisioned 
would be incapable of getting the larger powers in NATO to consult with 
20 the a;:Lliance as a whole. Canada also expressed opposition to the idea 
l9tester B. Pearson, "The Face of the World in 1965, " External 
Affairs, XVII (March, 1965 ) ,  84. 
20James Eqrs, Canada in World Affairs : 1955-19$7 (Toronto: 
Oxf�rd University Press, 1959T; P• 72. 
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proposed b.r the United States and Great Britain at the Atlantic Congress 
in 1959 that certain decisions of the NATO Council should be adopted by 
less than unanimous vote. The idea was to make the Council a more 
decisive organization, but to smaller nations such as Canada the 
proposal seemed to hint at a centralization of power under big power 
21 domination. The December, 1960 proposal of General De Gaulle to create 
an inner cabinet or triumvirate composed of the United States, Great 
Britain, and France to act as the decision-making authority over all 
NATO matters was rejected by Canada as more big power domination and 
could upset the Canadian government's hope to •preserve the fundamental 
character of NATO as an association of equals."22 While Canada was 
opposed to these early suggestions toward solving the NATO dilemma, she 
did not appear to have a specific solution to the problem herself. �ther 
than the creation of a genuine Atlantic commu.nity--an alternative which 
had failed to gain mu.ch support among the other members. Canada desired 
a greater voice in NATO affairs--nuclear and non-nuclear--and more con­
sultation within the alliance, but did not want big power directorates 
or binding obligations to support NATO decisions in matters either inside 
or outside NATO jurisdiction. Mr. Howard Green, Canadian Minister of 
External Affairs, summarized his country' s feelings in a speech before 
the House of Commons in December, 1960 regarding NATO jurisdiction in 
2L -liichard A. Preston, Canada in World Affairs : 
Oxford University Press, 1965), P• 194.-
22�., P• 197 . 
1959-1961 (Toronto : 
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areas outside its treat7-defined limits : 
Canada's opinion is that nations should be informed of the 
views of the other members of the alliance with regard to prob­
lemB arising in these areas, but we have never agreed that there 
should be consultation in the sense of creating an obligation on 
the part o1 •Jlber countries with regard to areas outside the 
NATO area. 3 
In regard to NATO decisions within the organization 1 s geographic 
lind.ts of jurisdiction, Canada's position was not stated quite so ex­
plicit]J', but its hints at not wanting to be bound by "pre-tixed 
positions" or other than unanimous votes of the NATO Council were 
sufficient to indicate that even Canada was not prepared to see a 
system evolve in NATO which would bind that country" too close]J' to the 
decisions of the alliance members as a whole. 
The idea of the Multilateral Nuclear Force proposed by' the United 
States to give the other NATO members somewhat more control over nuclear 
weapons while at the same time retaining United States custody of the 
warheads, was not received by' Canada as the panacea for NATO's internal 
problems by' any means. Canadian statements relating to the MLF proposal 
were, in fact, rather ambiguous; seeming to neither endorse nor veto the 
idea completei,,, but lea'Ving the matter open to further discussion . The 
most conclus�ve statement came from Secretary of State for External 
Affairs Paul Martin on December 23, 1964, when he said: "We do not be­
lieve th.at the proposals concerning the creation ot a multilateral 
23 
Ibid., P• 198. 
61 
nuclear force., taken by- themselves., are capable of solving the whole of 
this problem. u 24 Canadian policy concerning the MLF thus tended toward 
the negative unless additional but always unspecified improvements were 
made. Since no worthwhile improvements were offered to supplement the 
original MLF concept., Canada was not particularly disappointed when the 
controversial proposal was shelved. 
The issue of control over nuclear weapons and their targeting was · 
further complicated for a number of years from the Canadian standpoint 
because the Conservative government of Jolm Diefenbaker did not want to 
accept atomic weapons. Thus ., during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962., 
when the Canadian CF-lOlB fighters and Bomarc missiles under NORAD were 
rendered useless because they lacked nuclear warheads, so also were the 
Canadian CF-104 interceptors and Honest John missiles under NATO useless 
for the very same reason . 
25 
As discussed in an earlier chapter., the 
reasons for this lack of nuclear armament on weapons systems specifically 
designed for such armament included Canada' s desire to act as an arbiter 
and •shining example" in any disarmament negotiations and also reflected 
· that country ' s  attitude of leaving the nuclear weapons arsenal with its 
expense and obligations in the hands of the United States. 
The refusal by Canada to accept atomic weapons for its units in 
24p..111 Martin, Canada and the International Situation., Information 
Division, Department of External Affairs, Circular 6W36 (ottavat 
Department of External Affairs, 1964) ., p. 4. 
2SJames Eqrs, 11Sharing a Continent : The Hard Issues, " The United 
States and Canada, ed. John S. Dickey- (Englewood Cli.tfs, N. J. :--isrentice-
Hall, Inc • ., 1964), p. 64. 
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NATO left the organization with definite weak points in the defense 
screen wherever Canadian units were assigned. General Lauria Norsted, 
the American supreme commander of NATO, visited Ottawa, Canada, on 
January 3, 1963 at a time when the debate over Canada's position on 
nuclear weapons was intense. He confirmed that Canada had., indeed, 
made an oral agreement to equip both its NATO (and NORAD) forces with 
nuclear weapons. Since Canada had failed so far to equip its fighter 
squadrons in Europe with the agreed weapons, it was his opinion that 
Canada had not met NATO requirements. 26 With the NATO situation being 
tied so close� to that of NORAD., the debate within the Canadian govern­
ment tended to consider the two issues as one. The Department of Ex­
ternal Affairs, headed by Howard Green., took the anti-nuclear weapons 
position and the Defense Department under Douglall Harkness took the 
pro-nuclear weapons position. The latter actual� worked in close 
harnt0ny with the Pentagon, and its opinions coincided with those of the 
United States on the question of Canada's possession of nuclear weapons 
within the NATO organization.27 The issue was finall)" resolved after 
the Pearson government came to power in .lpril, 1963. Canadian units 
assigned to NATO were supplied with atomic warheads (under American 
custody) for the weapons systems they already possessed. 
26 
Gerald Clark, Canada: The Uneasy Neighbor (New York : David 
McKq Company, 196S), p. 77. 
27 
Peter C. Newman, Renegade in Power :  The Diefenbaker Years 
(Bew York : Bobbs-Merrill Comp8IJ1'., Inc., 1963), p. 341. 
6.3 
The current crisis in NATO has affected both the United States 
and Canada to a considerable degree. As leader of the alliance, the 
United States cannot fail to be particularl.3' concerned with the divisive 
situation threatening the alliance. Yet, United States involvement in 
the Vietnamese war has directed American attention to an area far removed 
from NATO considerations with the result that alliance considerations 
have been at least temporarily surpassed in importance bf Far Eastern 
difficulties. The rebirth of nationalism in nm.ch of Western Europe is 
likewise a force the United States seens unable to counter. It threatens 
not only American leadership but the future of the alliance itself'. The 
relaxed mood of most European countries brought about b;r their reeent]3 
acquired affluence and the likewise recent belief that the Soviet threat 
is rapid:cy, receding has also made it extreme]3 difficult for the United. 
28 States to mold NATO policy in accord with its own needs and desires. 
The obvious but unannounced American policy in regard to NATO in the 
last two years has been tantamount to a "hold-the-line" policy gauged 
to preserve the alliance intact until the United States can once again 
turn its attention to NATO affairs unburdened with pressing considerations 
elsewhere. 
I'. 
Canadian policy, like that of the United States, has been one of 
attempting to prevent the dissolution of the organization in the face of 
the various internal and external pressures acting against it. Unlike 
28 
"Europe ' s  New Mood--Its Meaning for u. s . , "  u. s .  News � 
World Report, LI (June 20, 1966) ,  .39 . 
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the United States., Canada is not the target or European emotionalism and 
thus can operate more effectively- as a mediation force. Yet Canada . has 
been no more success:f'ul than any other nation in finding solutions to 
NATO ' s  difficulties., and the crisis confronting NATO appear� to be far 
too much for any single country to hope to ameliorate. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has served well the 
interests of both the United States and Canada. It has first and fore­
most helped to preserve the freedom of both nations by- preventing the 
communist conquest or Western Europe and by helping to rebuild the 
devastated economies of the continent. The United States has been able 
to exert its own European policies through the NATO alliance by virtue 
of its immense power, and thus the organization has served as a useful 
instrument of American diplomacy. Canada, while unable to exert such 
tremendous influence upon Europe by reason of its NATO membership has, 
nonetheless, been able to maintain close ties vi th the area and in so . 
doing partial'.q offset the influence of the United States within Canada 
itself. 
The important goals which each North American country aought to 
attain through NATO, while not always the same, have been achieved to a 
considerable degree-the possible exception being Canada ' s  attempt to 
counter American influence with closer ties with Western Europe which 
has met with only limited success. From the standpoint of both countries., 
NATO must be considered an overall success., albeit not in the 100 per 
cent category or in some of the more specific issues which haTe come 
before the organization. Current NATO proble• bode ill for both 
countries in the future, but past benefits al.rea<i1' have proven 
sufficient to justify the formation of the alliance. 
65 
CHAPTER VI 
THE QUESTION OF CHINA 
The China problem has been a source of contin11:al aggravation for 
both the United States and Canada since the 1949 victory of Mao Tse-tung 1 s 
communist forces over those of the nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek. 
For the United States this communist victory- represented a serious set­
back after a hundred years of American involvement of V&ry'ing degrees in 
Chinese affairs. While this involvement was initial� brought about by 
the United States for commercial reasons, the twentieth century gradually 
brought with it a new attitude resulting in considerable .American sym-
1 
pat.by for and aid to China. Mao I s revolution thus seemed to many 
Americans to be a rather strange way of expressing China' s friendship and 
appreciation to the United States. The fact that this break between 
friends occurred a brief four years after the two countries had achieved 
victory over a common foe following years of close alliance and mutual 
2 
assistance proved all the more difficult for Americans to understand. 
Unlike the United States·, Canada had had very little contact with China 
historically, and had participated on only' a very limited scale during 
the war in the Pacific with virtually' no contact with the Chinese. In 
1A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of th� United States 
(Ifev Haven : Yale University Press;-1938), p. 338. - --
2Robert A. Devine (ed. ), American Foreign Policy (New York: 
Meridian Books, Inc., 1960), P• 273 . 
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examining the policies of the two countries in regard to the China prob­
lem during the Cold War., the dif'fe�ent relationships of the two nations 
with China prior to the communist conquest should not be forgotten. 
A.merican· aid to China was suspended in November., 1949 with the 
ouster of Chiang Kai-shek 1 s forces from the mainland to their redoubt 
on the island of Formosa. All military assistance ., however., had been 
severely' reduced long before this date and finally complete]J" curtailed 
b7 August., 1949.3 Aid to the nationalists on Formosa was resumed by the 
United States in 1951 and has continued in various forms until the 
present time. This assistance has been primari11" of a military nature 
to build up the nationalist armed forces and offset the might of Comnmnist 
China.4 In addition, .American naval forces of the Seventh Fleet have 
patrolled the Formosa Straits since 1951 to prevent a clash between the 
two Chinas. The Korean War had a very- significant impact upon United 
States policy toward Communist China. The United States had bare]J" come 
to recognize mainland China as communist when it was forced to regard the 
recent ally as an enentV in actual combat. This sobering experience con­
tributed immenseq to the hard-line attitude which the United States has 
generall,1" maintained toward Communist China throughout the great part of 
the Cold War up until the present time.5 American public opinion toward 
3w1111am L.  Langer (ed . ) ., An Encyclopedia of World History 
(Boston : Houghton Mifflin Comp� 1952), p. 1210. 
4John K. Fairbank., Edwin o. Reischauer., Albert M.  Craig., East 
Asia: The Modem Transformation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Comp&ny'., 
N5), �880. 
Siiobert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (New York: Doubledq 
68 
China, which was formed during the Korean conflict and which views that 
country with particular distate, has shown little inclination for 
change .6 This attitude has been re.fleeted in the actions of the Ameri­
can government to a considerable degree� and any lessening of this 
stand which may have occurred in the past two years has been primarily 
as a result of efforts to negotiate an end to the conflict in Vietnam. 
It was upon American insistence in June, 19$0 that the mainland 
communist government was first denied the Chinese seat in the United 
Nations in favor of the nationalist government which had held the seat 
as the legal government of China since the start of the world organiza­
tion . Only' days later, on June 27, 1950, the Security Council gave 
approval for United Nations forces (then non-existent) to oppose the 
invasion of North Korean troops into South Korea. 7 The active support 
initial]T supplied North Korea b;y Red China and, finally., the formal 
intervention of Chinese armies on the side of North Korea against United 
Nations forces did little to enhance the reputation of the mainland 
Chinese government among ma.ey member states of the United Nations . The 
United States, whose forces made up the overwhelming majority of the 
United Nations forces--and casualties--had particular reason to hold 
harsh opinions of the Communist Chinese government. 
American policy toward Conmnmist China has had two particularly 
outstanding tactics which have been utilized since the years 1949 and 
and Comp8l1J', 1964) , pp. 355-356 . 
6Ibid. 
7Rqmond Dennett (ed . ), Documents � American Foreign Relations : 
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1950, respective11". The first tactic has been the American ref'usal to 
extend diplomatic recognition to the regime of' Mao Tse-tung. Instead, 
the government of' Nationalist China on Formosa has been considered by 
the United States to be the o� legitimate government of' China. The 
communist regime is considered to be the � facto government of' the 
mainland but not the � jure government which is the necessary qualif'ica-
tion for American recognition. The forceful methods used by the com-
munists to attain power in China are the prima.ry cause for the United 
States failure to grant reeogni tion to Mao Tse-tung I s government. The 
reasoning behind this American policy reflects once again the overall 
attention given to idealistic and moralistic considerations by the 
United States in determining its foreign policy. Yet, in regard to the 
Communist Chinese regime in particular, the utilization of' morality- in 
international relations has proven beneficial for quite political con­
siderations. Th.is refusal by the United States to extend diplomatic 
recognition to Communist China has influenced many American allies, 
particularly in South America and Southeast Asia, to follow the same 
course of action . As a partial result of this refusal to grant recog­
nition to the communist regime, coupled with the various alliances 
which either fo� or implicitly prohibit close relations with the 
Chinese Co:nummist government, the United States has been successful to 
1951 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), llII, p. 955 . 
8Pau1 E. Zinner (ed.), Documents on American Foreign Relations 
1957 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 19;8), pp . 340-341. 
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a significant degree in containing Red Chinese influence in world 
affairs. 
The second tactic utilized by the United States to counter the 
communist govemmen� in Peking has been to oppose that regime' s admis­
sion to the General Assembl.7 and Security Council of the United Nations 
as the legitimate government of China. As indicated earlier, this 
policy was first used in 1950 and has been successfully carried out 
each year since that time. While the General Assembly has always voted 
to refuse to grant the Communist Chinese a seat in the world organiza­
tion, the margin of support for the American position has declined from 
a vote of thirty-three against and sixteen for seating with ten absten­
tions in 1950, 9 to forty-seven against and forty-seven for admission 
with twenty abstentions in 1965. lO Apparently because of the Vietnamese 
War, the turmoil in Indonesia, and the beginning of the purges in Com­
nnmist China, this trend against the American position was altered in 
the November, 1966 vote which resulted in fifty-seven nations voting 
against Red China ' s  admission, forty-six for admission, and seventeen 
abstentions.11 
9John w. Holmes, "Canada and China: The Dilemmas of a Middle 
Power," Policies Toward China, ed. A. M. Halpern (New York t McGraw­
Hill Book Co. , 1965), P •  507. 
10The Knoxville News-Sentinel, November 17, 1966, p. 6. 
11 
•CoDDIUlliat China Votet" Conf
essional Quarterly Weekly 
Report, mv (December 2, 1966 J, 292 . 
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Essentially the American position holds that the Nationalist 
Chinese government is the on� legal government or China and, therefore, 
the only government eligible for the China seat in the United Nations. 
The United States also maintains that even if the communist regime were 
regarded as a separate national entity, it would be ineligible for 
United Nations membership on the basis or Article 4 of the United Nations 
Charter which requires all member states to be "peace-loving"--reflecting 
the fact that Communist China once waged war against United Nations 
forces. The attitude of the United States was best summarized in a 
speech to the members or the Associated Press on Mq 10, 1954, by Henry 
Cabot Lodge, the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, who 
indicated ten reasons why this country opposed Red China's admission to 
the United Nations. He indicated that American opposition was not oncy­
because of the illegal accession to power of the communist govemment; 
its continual fomenting of revolutions elsewhere; its commission of 
atrocities against United States soldiers; and illegal imprisoning of 
American citizens;  but also : 
Because it has repeatedly expressed open contempt for the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations, and the judgements 
of the international conmmnity; because it stands convicted by 
the United Nations as an aggressor in Korea where it killed and 
wounded many tho�ands of American and other soldiers who were 
defending peace. 
This United States policy or excluding Red China from the United 
12 
United States Department of State, American Foreign Policy 
l�0-1955; Basic Documents (Washington : Govel'lllllll!lt Printing Office, 19 7), PP • 342•343. 
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Nations has achieved the desired results of once again helping to 
isolate or at least reduce Chinese Communist influence in the world at 
large. In addition, this policy has prevented the establishment of an­
other influential communist voice within the United Nations itself, par­
ticular:q in the Security Council. 
Another method which the United States has been able to utilize 
effectivei,, in seeking to deter Chinese Communist expansion has actual� 
served two purposes. In conjunction with other treaties, including the 
ANZUS pact, the Philippines Treaty, the South Korea Treaty, and the 
SEATO Treaty; the United States signed with Chiang Kai-shek the Re­
public of China Treaty. The China pact and the other treaties rounded 
out the United States security system in the Western Pacific and have 
served as an effective buffer to Communist Chinese expansion.13 In 
addition to countering the commmist expansion, the treaty with 
Nationalist China has given the government of Chiang Kai-shek additional 
prestige in international circles and has added validity to his conten­
tion that his regime is the legal government of all China. As Secretary 
or State Dulles indicated in discussing the treaty, the United States has 
committed itself to the defense of the nationalist government on Formosa 
against aggression from the comnnmist mainland, and, in addition, 
guarantees that the nationalist government cannot be "bartered away" in 
some future deal with Red China. Thus, American policy is not oni,, 
1.3nennett., !?E.. cit. , p. 955 • 
14Ibid. 
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strongq opposed to Communist Chinese membership in the United Nations 
and diplomatic recognition of the mainland regime, but has also become 
treaty-bound to defend the nationalist govemment on Formosa. 
At this jwicture it is advisable to examine the policies of 
Canada on the China question in regard to diplomatic relations, 
Communist Chinese membership in the United Nations, and Western defense 
alliances. As mentioned earlier, Canada did not suffer the psychological 
shock as did the United States when China went communist. It was dis­
appointed by the chain of events which culminated in the ouster of the 
nationalist government, but the fact that Canada was, to a large degree, 
uninvolved in the Far East militated against any serious concern as that 
shown by the United States. 
Canadian policy in regard to recognition of Communist China has 
been influenced from almost the beginning by American policy on the same 
problem. Before the outbreak of the Korean War, however, Canada was 
prepared to follow the lead of the Commonwealth nations such as Great 
Britain and India and recognize the conmmnist regime, primarily' because 
of its de � control of the mainland.is This initial but quite brief 
attitude toward recognition soon changed with Chinese Communist partici­
pation in the Korean War against the United Nations whose forces included 
units from Canada. "Canada took the attitude that it would be improper 
and pointless to accord recognition to a regime which, although not 
lSB. s .  Keirstead, Canada in World Affairs : 1951-1953 (Toronto: 
Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 234-235. 
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openly at war with the United Nations., was., nevertheless, sending 
pretended • volunteer' forces to assist the enenv.•16 After the con­
clusion of the Korean War, Canadian policy continued to be one of non­
recognition • . This policy was to a very considerable degree influenced 
by the American policy or non-recognition. The Canadian government 
.felt that United States policy was so unyielding and American public 
opinion so intense that Canada could not escape grave repercussions if 
it granted diplomatic recognition to the connmmist regime.
17 Thus 
Canadian policy became inextricab:cy, entwined with that of the United 
States on the China question. 
Since the establishment or this policy during the Korean War, 
Canada has maintained the non-recognition policy throughout the last 
fifteen years or the Cold War. Critics have continua� charged that 
Canadian attitudes on the China problem have been dominated by the 
United States., and "just as the policy of non-recognition had acquired 
a kind of symbolic significance in the United States, so in Canada it 
had come to symbolize the domination of Canadian extemal policy by 
·American interests.•18 Yet ., even though in appearance, at least, Canada 
might be following the lead of the United States on the China issue, in 
fact Canada had a somewhat more relaxed and conciliatory attitude toward 
16Ibid. , p. 59. 
17�. , P• 235. 
18James Eayrs, Canada in World Affairs: 1955-1957 (Toronto: 
Oxford University Press., 1959), P• 79. 
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the Peking regime. Lester B. Pearson, who was then Minister of External 
Affairs, stated in January-, 1956 the Canadian govemment • s  official 
policy toward Red China: 
We have made this re-examination and we feel that the careful 
policy we have been following., and are still following has been 
the right one; rejecting on the one hand immediate diplomatic 
recognition but rejecting on the other hand the view that a 
comrmmist regime in iJldng . can never be recognized as the 
government of China. 
From recent statements by Canadian leaders it is apparent that this 
same general non-recognition policy is still the official policy in deal-
. . 
ing with Conmnmist China, but more attention is being given to opening 
up contacts with the mainland. Trade between Canada and Communist China 
has gone on for years, and newsmen, professional people, and other 
interested individuals and groups have visited mainland China over a 
20 
lengthy period of time with the approval of the Canadian government. 
Canadian officials have sought, through private contacts, to 
temper .American policy toward China but have never blunt:cy- urged the 
21 
United States to reverse its position on the Communist China question. 
Even though Canadian public opinion and the news media in recent years 
have looked with favor upon recognizing the Mao Tse-tung government, 
the Canadian government has maintained its long-held position of non­
recognition.;.-particular� in light of the Vietnamese War. As one 
19 8 Ibid • ., P• 1. 
20 
Holmes, �· £!! • ., P• lo6. 
2
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authority put it : 
To risk American irritation is one thingJ to make what 
Americans would inevi tabl.y' look upon as a friend]J' gesture 
/recognition7 toward those who are abetting the killing of 
American soldiers requires a degree of boldness and conf'igfnce 
which has not characterized Canadian policy toward China . 
It appears that for the near future at least., Canadian policy toward 
recognition of Conmnmist China will continue unchanged., primari� because 
of' American attitudes. While the United States has maintained diplomatic 
contacts since 19$$ with the Red Chinese government through meetings in 
Warsaw., Poland, and has ., in recent months., relaxed its restrictions upon 
travel to mainland China by newsmen., academicians, and other interested 
parties., it seems most unlikely that the non-recognition policy will be 
changed soon. It does appear certain, however, that if' and when a 
formula can be devised which is acceptable to the United States and 
which guarantees the independence of both Chinas and provides for the 
membership of both in the United Nations., that Canada will accept it 
immediately and welcomely. 
23 
In regard to the problem of Communist China's membership in the 
United Nations, Canada ' s policy until late 1966 followed in a general wa;;y 
that of' the United States but with a greater tendency to favor increased 
contacts between the United Nations and Red China at some level. Just 
as the United States, Canada has never voted for the seating of' Communist 
China in the United Nations. Yet, Canada has been rather ambiguous on 
22Ibid., p. 122 . 
23Ibid. ,  p. lll. 
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the question of admittance until recent times. In an address at Prince­
ton University in 1955, Lester B. Pearson, then Minister of External 
Affairs, remarked: 
Certainly the absence from negotiations and discussions-­
at the United Nations or elsevhere--of the de facto power on 
the Chinese mainland makes impossible, without the consent of 
the regime, the effective settlement of disputed matters 
around that countey- 1 s periphery-: Korea, Formosa., or Indo­
China. 
If' such problems as these are to be dealt with through the 
United Nations by" conciliatory- procedures., then either the 
Comnunist Chinese must come to the United Nations, or the 
United Nations DD.1st go t�4
them. There is no third course 
except the use of force. 
This 1955 statement reflected Canada's belief that it was desirable for 
the United Nations to have some official dealings with the Chinese Com­
munist government. While Canada followed a policy of opposing Red 
China's admission into the world organization, the statement appears 
purpose� vague regarding China's "coming to" the United Nations in 
order that it not entire� exclude the chances of admission or openly 
propose such admission. 
Until late 1966 Canada's pollc7 had changed very little. In a 
statement on Comnunist China's admission to the United Nations, Paul 
Martin., the Canadian Minister of External Affairs, stated in March, 
1966: 
Although we have not been prepared to support the entry of 
Communist China into the United Nations on the terms it has so 
2
1i>onaJ.d c .  Masters, Canada in World Affairs : 1953-1955 
( Toronto : Oxford University Press.,1959), pp. 113-114. 
far set, we have ma.de it clear in our own statements of policy 
that we recognized the dosirability of having that nation in 
the world organization.2' 
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Thus, Canada once again indicated that under the right conditions it 
would be prepared to support Communist China's membership in the world 
organization. The right conditions for membership were, in part, the 
same as those stated or implied on past occasions by the United States 
and included respect for Formosa's independence and right to membership 
in the United Nations, and the pledge not to engage in aggressive war­
fare in the Far East. Differing from the American position, however, 
Canada had not been insistent in holding to the belief that the com­
munist regime was not the legal government of all of China.26 
In November, 1966 Canada significantly altered its position on 
Comnnmist China's membership in the United Nations. Secretary of State 
for External Affairs Paul Martin proposed that a two-China idea be 
studied by the United Nations. Martin visualized a solution whereby 
Communist China would be seated in both the Security Council and the 
General Assemb:cy,, and Nationalist China would be dropped from the 
Security Council but would remain seated in the General Assem.bly. 27 The 
success of such a proposal is very Dlllch open to question, but the fact 
25Paul Martin, "An Independent Foreign Policy, " External Affairs, 
XVIII (March, 1966), 125. 
2�ard Mc'Whinney, "Canadian-United States Commercial Relations 
and International Law," Canada-United States Treaty Relations, ed. David 
R. Deener (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1963), p. 140. 
27Tom Wicker, "Two Chinas, One China, No China," New York Times, 
November 16, 1966, P• 4. 
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that Canada has made a substantial change in its policy cannot be denied. 
Canada is apparently initiating a new course of action in its China 
policy which is different from that of the United States, and future 
events may witness a permanent shif't in Canadian policy away from close 
cooperation with the United States on the China problem. It might be 
mentioned at this point that even the position of. the United States has 
become somewhat less rigid on the seating of Commnist China. While the 
official American policy outlined by Ambassador Goldberg continued to 
oppose admission, approval was given to an Italian proposal to establish 
a committee for studying the entire China problem. In his statement 
Goldberg seemed to imp� that if' Red China dropped its demands for the 
ouster of Nationalist China from the worl� body and �nded its threats 
and use of force against other independent states, the United States 
might be willing to accept Communist Chinese membership in the United 
Nations in some form.28 Thus, the United States appears to be slowly 
altering its position to some extent on this important question also, 
but the recent upheavals in mainland China may alter this recent 
apparent shift in attitude • 
.Another comparison which can be made between United States and 
Canadian policy relating to China concerns the relations of the two 
countries with Nationalist China. As discussed earlier, the United 
States policy since 1951 has been to extend considerable aid of a 
28un1ted States Department of State, "Move to Change Representa­
tion of China in u. N. Again Rejected by the General Assembly, 11 
Department of State Bullet.in, LV (December 191 1966) 1 927. 
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primarily military nature to Chiang Kai-shek 1 s govemment and to stead­
fast]J' support his claim that his government is the sole legal govern­
ment of China. In addition, the United States has signed a treaty with 
Chiang 1 ·s government protecting it from aggression from the mainland. 
Canada has taken a different attitude toward Nationalist China. 
While Canada has diplomatic relations with the Formosa govermnent, it 
maintains no embassy or diplomatic personnel on the island. Nationalist 
·china, however, does have representatives in Canada. 29 · Contrary to the 
policy of the United States, Canada has no treaty obligations of any kind 
with the Formosa government. During the 1955 and 1958 confrontations in 
the Formosa . Straits between nationali�t and communist forces over the 
disputed islands of Quemoy and Matsu, Canada held to the opinion that 
the disputes were a continuation of the Chinese Civil War and interven­
tion by' outside forces was improper. The United States, after much 
lack of elucidation, f� included the two island groups with.in the 
Formosa treaty obligations, thereby committing American forces to the 
defense of the islands. 30 Thus, during the two crises in the Formosa 
Straits the United States was deep]J' committed while Canada remained 
completely uninvolved. 
A further difference between Canada ' s  relations with the Formosa 
government and those of the United States concerns the actual legal 
29 
Eayrs, �· cit., P• 82. 
30 
Ibid., PP• 82-83. 
status of Chiang Kai .. shek' s government. The United States places no 
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time limit on the nationalists ' claims of ownership to the island of 
Formosa, but the Canadians regard Chiang' s regime as only temporar,- and 
believe that eventually the future of Formosa will have to be determined 
on a permanent basis by the people of the island themselves. 3
1 
From the 
American standpoint it is essential that Formosa still be considered part 
of pre-revolutionary China in order to support the very existence of a 
Nationalist China at all. If' Formosa were not regarded as a legal 
province of China there would be only one China, and the American case 
against Communist China would be seriously weakened. The Canadians, 
however, have regarded the Chiang regime as an interloper and not fully 
in tune with the feelings of the native Formosans. Sine� doubt had been 
cast on China ' s  claims to Formosa before the 1949 revolution, Canada 
presently feels that the question of whether Formosa is an integral part 
of China or an :independent entity is 'a proper question and should be 
resolved eventual.:cy". 
32 
This somewhat cooler attitude toward the legality of the Chiang 
Kai-shek government on Canada ' s  part is once again in line with i�s 
general policy on the China question. While Canada has little sympathy 
for the communist govemment of the mainland, i� has scarce]J' any more 
for the nationalist government on Formosa. One Canadj 8ll authority has 
even argued that as far as Canada is concemed, •the key problem is not 
l1n,id., P•  83. 
32Ibid. 
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so much the recognition of Communist China as the issue of Formosa's  
future status. •33 If one accepts this theory regarding Canadian policy, 
it would be possible to make the comparison that American policy on the 
Chinese question revolves about the problem of the future status of the 
communist mainland government while Canadian policy centers essentially 
on �he issue of the future status or the nationalist government on For­
mosa with the communist regime accepted as the legal government of all 
of China. The difference in the China policies of the two countries 
would be significant according to this theory. Canadian public policy, 
however, has not been this far divorced from that of the United States 
so the merit of this theory is open to question since sufficient infor­
mation is not in public hands . 
The China policies of Canada and the United States are nowhere 
ioore in opposition to each other than in regard to the question of trade 
with the communist mainland. Both countries "subscribe to the NATO rules 
restricting the export of strategic materials to communist countries . •34 
Since 1949 the United States has not only restricted trade in strategic 
goods, but, in addition, has prohibited all trade with the Minl.,nd re­
gime. The theory underqing the American policy is that a.ey trade with 
the enemy is not in the national interest because of its beneficial 
33ai.chard A. Preston, Canada in World Affairs : 19$9-1961 
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1965), p.  118. 
34John W. Holmes , "The Relationship in Alliance and in World 
Affairs, " The United States and Canada, ed. John s. Dickey (Englewood 
Cliffs, N .T.: Prentice-Hall, Inc . , 1964)., pp • . 117-ll8 . 
3S effects for the opponent and, hence, should not be permitted. The 
American government is firmly committed to restricting trade with Red 
China, and no changes in this policy will be forthcoming in the near 
future. In view of the Vietnam War presently being waged, it would be 
impossible, militarily and politicaJ.1:T, to alter the present policy. 
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Canada has pursued a different policy entirely from that of the 
United States. While the prohibition on trade in strategic material is 
still in effect, trade in other commodities has been greatly expanded in 
recent years. Prior to 1961 very- little trade took place between Com­
munist China and Canada . In 19$9, total trade between the two nations 
amounted to $9., 2101000, and in 1960 the total had risen to $13,0001 000 
worth of goods. Beginning in 1961, however., Canadian exports to China 
rose dramatically because of the large grain purchases which the latter 
made with Canada beginning in that year. For the years 1961 throug� 
1964, respectively, Canadian exports to Communist China totaled: 
$125,000., 000; $147, 000.,000J $10,.,000,000; and $136,000, 000 worth of 
36 commodities--almost entirely grain. New and larger contracts have 
been signed between the two countries in recent months. Chinese exports 
to Canada, however, have remained quite small in comparison., and the 
communist government has indicated that this imbalance cannot continue. 
In 1963, Red China exported only $5., 0001 000 of furs, nuts, and textiles 
35J .  W. Fulbright, "Foreign Polley-Old Myths and New Realities, • 
American Government: Readings and Cases
t 
ed. Peter Woll (second edition; 
Boston: Little, Brown and Compaiiy., 196�J, pp. 531-532. 
36ifollles ., "Canada and China., " 2.E• cit. , P• 113. 
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to Canada, and in 1964 the figure was $8,000, 000.
37 
Two essential factors have motivated Canada in exporting wheat 
and other grains to Red China. Economical]J', Canada has needed to trade 
because it has suffered a balance of payments deficit, and in the ear;cy, 
1960 1 s its farmers in the prairie provinces were suffering from depressed 
markets. In 1963 the prairie provinces remained Conservative in the 
election, and this fact is attributed to the first grain deals with 
Communist China. 38 In the last few years public opinion in Canada has 
come to favor these shipments of wheat, so politically it ·is profi�ble 
to continue the transactions. In ad.di tion, the Uni te.d States has been 
in a much better economic position relative to Canad.a to be able to re­
fuse to sell wheat to Communist China. 39 A second reason which has 
swayed Canada is its belief that trade embargoes are not effective 
instruments in altering opponents • foreign policies; thus once again 
differing from the American viewpoint.4° For these two reasons Canada 
has had a completely different trade policy toward Communist China than 
has the United States, and for the foreseeable future it appears - that 
both nations will continue their current trade policies relative to the 
Chinese Communist government. 
The overall China policies of the United States and Canada up 
until very recent:cy have been fair:cy similar in the matters of 
37Ibid. 
38Ibid.,  p. 107. 
39Ibid. , P• ll3.  
40ibid. 
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recognition of the mainland regime and its admission to the United 
Nations. Canada, more than the United States, has held to the hope that 
some compromise solution uy be reached regarding the communist regime, 
and with its new approach in the United Nations, a change may. be develop­
ing in Canada's entire polic7 toward Red China. A different attitude 
already exists f'rom. that of the United States regarding trade, relations 
with the nationalist government ., and Far East al�ances. Future events 
may indicate that the two countries will utilize complete� different 
policies in dealing with the China problem . 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
The preceding ana�is of Canadian and United States foreign 
policies indicates that several important conclusions can be made 
regarding the foreign policies of both nations. 
The most significant conclusion that can be stated is that both 
countries are in agreement on the overall goals of their foreign policies. 
During the Cold War the United States and Canada have had as their pri­
mary objective the preservation of their nations from conquest by inter­
national conmiunism. For twenty years the foreign relations of both 
countries have been conducted on the assumption that communism is a 
constan� menace which manifests itself in virtually all aspects of 
foreign affairs and DD1st always be considered in the fornmlation of any 
particular policy. Both the United States and Canada have recognized 
not only the need but the desirability for collective action and mutual 
defense alliances in protecting their own national interests. The two 
nations share the idea that events far removed from their own shores 
can., nonetheless., have a direct bearing upon their own countries and 
that the maintenance of effective military- establishments and meaningful 
f' oreign aid programs are essential in promoting their own interests. As 
the two giants of North America sharing similar languages ., cultures, 
legal traditions, democratic ideals., and interlocking economies., their 
futures are dependent upon one another, and their overall interests are 
very similar. 
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While the prima:cy objectives are much the same, the United States 
and Canada have not always utilized the same methods for achieving these 
goals or shared the same attitudes on particular issues. United States 
policies have been based on the position it occupies as leader of the 
,,. . 
Free World, and American attitudes have been characterized by distrust 
of and opposition to virtual.q all things communist . Canada, as a middle 
power, has been more flexible in its approach to international issues 
touched by the influence of communism. Canadian policies toward Castro 
Cuba and Communist China serve as examples of this more flexible atti• 
tude . As a middle power Canada has been able to propose al temati ves 
to accepted policies which the United States could not do because of 
its leadership role which requires it to move more slowly on adopting 
new ideas and practices. Canadian freedom of action is somewhat in­
hibited by .American considerations, however, and a completel1" independent 
foreign policy for the former is impossible under present circumstances. 
As leader of the Free World, United States interests and involvement 
extend themselves into all areas of the world. Canada, as a lesser 
power, � or may not find itself' d.irectq involved as a participant in 
every event which occurs throughout the world, and this .f'act has enabled · 
Canada to remain somewhat more aloof than the United States on many 
issues and has enhanced its role as a mediator in world trouble spots. 
The United States has resorted to such instruments as trade em­
bargoes, refusal to grant diplomatic recognition, and denial of · member­
ship in the United Nations to carry out its policies abroad. Canada 
has oftentimes opposed these methods because of what it feels is their 
ineffectiveness. In addition, Canada has sometimes been unable to en­
gage in restrictive trade practices or embargoes because of its weaker 
economic position relative to the United States. 
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Canada has been influenced in its international relations by a 
factor which the United States has not been faced with. This factor 
concerns Canada' s fear of absorption by the United States. Because of 
the numerous close ties between the two North American nations, Canada 
has found it necessary to guard, jealousq., its own national interests • 
.lt times, such as the Cuban missile crisis, this fact can inject itself 
into Canadian foreign relations with unf'ortunate results. 
An important fact gained from this ana�sis is that neither the 
United States nor Canada formulates its foreign policies in a vacuum. 
The two nations are so closely tied that neither can ignore the attitudes 
of the other. Problems concerning the Chinese and Cuban issues illustrate 
that neither nation can act unilaterally without considering the wishes 
of its neighbor. While the relationship is by no means equal and usually 
sees the United States influencing Canada in its policies, the situation 
does not always favor the larger. The most effective ,Americ� check on 
Canada is in the economic sphere because of its huge investment in 
Canadian industry. The primary check Canada has upon the United States 
is of a political nature through its ability to question international 
policies or actions of the latter. 
From this study it is apparent that while Canadian and American 
foreign policies share the same objectives and are often similar, there 
are many differences which exist, particularly in regard to methods, 
which distinguish the foreign policies of each country- from those of the other. 
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